Rear Echelon

First Launch

2008-06-03T12:48:00.001-07:00

Yes, this has already popped up on a number of forums; i'm summarizing and extending a bit here.

Last week, IDAS was test-fired for the first time from a submarine.

The German submarine U33 launched the missile while submerged from a torpedo tube, which then unfolded its wings, started the rocket motor and surfaced to go into a controlled flight. After 1500 meters flight the missile picked up the signature of a target drone flying nearby, and on confirmation by the controlling WSO successfully intercepted and destroyed it.

IDAS is the first system worldwide that can maintain fibre-optic guidance while breaking through the surface. Introduction of the missile is planned for around 2014.

Unlike a number of other experimental systems, the missile does not employ a real autonomous seeker of its own; instead, it is "interactive". This means it has an IR sensor, whose image is piped through the fibre-optic cable to the controlling submarine. The submarine's staff and computers evaluate the picture received, and can control the missile based on this.

Also unlike other sub-launched missile systems, IDAS does not employ a container underwater. The missile is directly soft-launched from a torpedo tube (quad-packed in a 21-inch tube), activating its own rocket motor while still underwater. This - in theory - even gives it something of a "stealthing" capability, as the missile would not necessarily have to surface near the submarine. With a mission range stated somewhere around 12 nm (due to the small size of the missile) for standard missions, there are limits to that of course.

IDAS is intended to provide submerged submarines with a short-range fibre-optic guided all-aspect missile for surface, air and land targets. Through the above sensor/cable instead of an autonomous seeker, the missile could also to a limited extent be used as a recon drone surveying the theater before destroying a target found, allowing targets of opportunity, in-flight target reprioritization or mission termination.

The US Navy has called the IDAS development - and in particular potential future proliferation - "dangerous", as it gives submerged submarines an active counter to airborne ASW assets.

Germany already had a similar system planned back in the 90s - Triton, derived from the Polyphem fibre-optic missile. Both Polyphem and Triton died about 5 years ago, with Triton never making it off the drawing boards. That IDAS is now actually being tested like this spells some better fortune for this time around.

Basis See Conference, Pt5 : Industry Implementations

2008-05-20T04:12:00.000-07:00

Speeches by:
Kai Horten : ATLAS ELEKTRONIK
Dirk Malgowski : Surface Ship Division, TKMS
Hermann J. Janssen : NAVTEC CONSULT

A number of more or less - rather less - solid proposals from the industry, to finalize this short series of posts.

"Meko Multirole Auxiliary"

TKMS offers this concept "for open discussion in MoD", not as "JSS proposal". Arguably, multi-role/mixed-capability ships with dual amphibious/logistics roles have been gaining market share lately. Examples given are the LPD for Portugal, LHD for South Africa or Canada's JSS.
Externally, the proposal looks remarkably close to the LHD offered by TKMS in the South African tender, i.e. the MHD150.

The Meko Multirole Auxiliary takes Nolting's suggestion of modularization, by offering a triple-role ship with multi-mission modules - TKMS suggests a role change would be possible "within 48 hours", and the modules would use "already introduced standard systems". The three roles to be assumed by this ship would be RAS, LHD and sealift.

- RAS role: 6,440t fuel, 600t cargo including ammunition, 3 helos
- LHD role: 750 troops, 650 lm, 870t cargo, 440t fuel, 14 helos
- Sealift role: 2,500 lm, 500t fuel, 2,500t dry cargo

Such a role change looks rather hefty - though, especially regarding this mix, there's already a decade of experience in the Bundeswehr with the A310 MRTT, which also uses a palletized module system to switch from transport to tanker. A ship of this size would be a far larger application of this of course.

"Trans Sea Lifter"

Another, entirely different concept is proposed by consulting company NAVTEC CONSULT. It proposes a very large system for the Basis See application sealift/transport in a modular framework.

Trans Sea Lifter would be a large SWATH ship. Multiple modules would be carried forward of superstructure. The dimensions are implied with a beam of around 50-60 meters, length in the example with three modules seems to be around 150-180 meters.

The loaded modules would essentially be FloFlo swimming sub-units. Module examples given would be e.g. lighter transport, dry cargo, command, armament.

A number of examples for application are given:

- transport modules, which themselves can be submerged for FloFlo (for transport and landing operations with lighters and LCUs/LCACs)
- multiple low-draft swimming base/support modules that can be brought into disaster areas and operate there independantly
- mothership/tender role in CSW operations to transport and supply small littoral combat surface units or submarines
- command/medical/logistics role in supporting land forces by using specialized modules for these applications
- modular system for air/surface theater warfare, including protective armament for entire Basis See task force

Especially the last one seems rather far-fetched. According to Janssen, it's only in the conception phase yet, primarily for commercial applications.

Lead from Sea

A number of "Lead from Sea" experiments with command-facility frigates have been going on for the past two years, and are being continued. The positive aspect of this is obvious: It's a cheap, simple solution.
These experiments are primarily intended for small footprint operations; an example situation from last year was leading land units from a F123 frigate to evacuate 50 civilians from a coastal nation.

Horten sees current potential as "Lead from Sea" platforms in those Bundeswehr ships that already have command facilities - the F123 and F124 frigates, the EGV AORs, and the A404 tenders (which house the staff of their squadrons).

In the near future, in particular F125 shows good promise of furthering the approach, as the new CMS being developed by ATLAS for it will be capable of integrating full air/surface awareness for such command facilities; as a first, there'll also be the possibility of integrating AWACS and DCRC into the overall picture through Link 16 interfaces.

ATLAS proposes a containerized proving concept, to be mounted aboard an EGV. The EGV currently possesses basic C2 facilities and Link 11 datalinks; the containerized system would add a Link 16 datalink, upgrade the Link 11, add a air/surface surveillance radar, and add a standard Army C2 system (as has been done in the frigate experiments).

ATLAS sees a number of potential synergy effects for future "Lead from Sea" systems by integrating current more or less experimental software offered by them; such as the ADLER interface that will be used on F125 to tie the 127mm gun into the Army Artillery C3 systems, the MiLiPos protocol integration system that allows exchanging data between different-protocol (Navy, Army, Airforce) command systems via Link 16, or the LexxWar asymmetric combat system that was used in trials last year.

Basis See Conference, Pt4 : Sealift Concepts

2008-05-19T01:54:00.000-07:00

Speaches by:
Rüdiger Kloevekorn : Steria Mummert Consulting
Christian Eckel : Surface Ship Division, TKMS

Two speaches that deal with the sealift options available to Germany. Kloevekorn mostly talks about GGSS, Eckel presents some options on GMSV.

As a short introduction: The current system for GGSS used by the Bundeswehr is the ARK contract jointly with Denmark. Under ARK, four RoRo ships are under pre-charter contracts and available as needed to the two nations with a pre-fixed cost limit. However, the ARK contract will end in 2011.

The Bundeswehr has hence looked into 2012+ options for sealift, and Steria Mummert Consulting, along with two other companies, has drafted a study for this at the request of the Bundeswehr.

Some results from this study are presented by Kloevekorn at this conference.

The study takes as its basis a "reasonable" maximum usage of sea transport; for Germany, that means concurrent transport for three different operations in a 30-day timeframe. The three scenarios looked into were apparently a NATO NRF operation, a Military Evacuation Operation, and the rotation of a peace-keeping contingent. The equipment requirements for these operations were given by the Bundeswehr.

Based upon this, an operational need was worked out, with a variation due to the possibility of using different European ports in different distances to the mission theaters - in particular with NRF a definitive option. Effectively, the Bundeswehr needs between 8000 and 13500 lanemeters RoRo sealift (3-5 ships with 2500-3000 lanemeters), plus 1200 TEU for the NRF operation and 70 TEU for the rotation.

As part of the study, a number of options are explored. The container transport would be a case for commercial transport - regular transport lines for the (long pre-planned) rotation operation, and a chartered container transport for the NRF operation.

For the sealift, not surprisingly, a continuation of ARK is suggested. It is concluded that an ARK transport - calling in all pre-contracted ships for 30 days - has similar costs to a commercial charter option. However, ARK adds the security of having the ships available as needed, and provides an upper cost limit. It's suggested that potentially a third German ship should be added to ARK, bringing the total to five ships. Additionally, a pre-charter option for two similar-sized RoRos is suggested to provide an extra 5000 lm, and the formation of a government or Bundeswehr agency that would secure long-term pre-charter contracts (to avoid costly short-term charter) is recommended.

Two alternatives are given. The first would be the option that the Royal Navy took - building (5) ships for the Bundeswehr itself, and then chartering them out through a public-private subcompany to increase cost effectiveness. The second alternative is a purely German version of ARK, implemented together with the German industry (an option if Denmark bows out of ARK, unlikely).

Eckel, a board member of the Surface Ship Division of TKMS, looks into GSMV primarily. GGSS is well-secured through ARK. GMSV is a clear capability lack, and the already noticed option of GMSV providing a shuttle service between a seabourne logistics base and land forces is also mentioned by him.

He sees three potential options for GMSV. The first one is, rather simply, international pooling - i.e. using Allied assets, or joint GMSV operation with Allies. The second option is a domestic design, for which TKMS offers their "innovative system engineering model" of course.

The third option is a bit more interesting - piggybacking on foreign projects. Of course TKMS isn't exactly happy about this option. However, he goes to the extent of naming examples that Germany could hop into - i.e. the French Mistral, the rather widespread Schelde Enforcer, and the Canadian JSS.

The selection of these in particular is somewhat interesting - i'd personally suspect the following reasons: Mistral to appease the government's idea of a "French-German motor" in Europe; Schelde Enforcer because those would at least provide construction contracts for the German industry; and the Canadian JSS because TKMS is already involved in that.

Part 5, the final part, will delve into GMSV a bit further, with some proposals.

Basis See Conference, Pt3 : The Other Services

2008-05-18T15:26:00.000-07:00

Speaches by:
Brig-Gen. Markus Kneip : Army C4I/CD&E Staff Division Leader; 2006 commander of ISAF Regional Command North
Brig-Gen. Jochen Both : Airforce C4I/CD&E Staff Division Leader
Brig-Gen. Heinrich Geppert : General of Future Development of the Joint Support Service (SKB)
Col.(Med) Bernd Mattiesen : Medical Service CD&E Staff Branch Leader

Now for the other side. The other four branches of the Bundeswehr get to present their view of Basis See too.

Kneip levels some criticism at the concept. The Navy has a level of ambition of leading up to 1000 ground soldiers from a Basis See command center for example; Kneip thinks that's way too much ambition. He also criticizes the basic issue of Supporting and Supported Commander - in his opinion, the Army commander of the ground troops should in almost all situations be the Supported Commander, with the Navy commander taking a back seat.

However, in his opinion, Basis See still offers a flexible instrument for short missions. Realistic missions named by him are in particular evacuation, extraction, and early entry. Basis See, in his opinion, is inefficient when land bases are operated in parallel.

The airforce sees limited application for the "Lead from Sea" concept of Basis See. There's particular potential for strategic Reach Back for Airforce assets, i.e. relaying tactical information between in-theater airborne assets and strategic C4ISTAR assets. Other applications are seen for example in limited theater C2 e.g. in Evacuation Operations, however a more widely applied maritime C2 infrastructure is seen as not necessary for the airforce, which would use land bases anyway.

Geppert doesn't show any criticism at all; he sees a demand for integration of the Joint Support Service's assets though, i.e. for "Lead from Sea" in particular interfaces to Military Intelligence and the Strategic Reconnaissance Command.

GMSV, the amphibious component, is similarly disputed. The Airforce of course thinks that such a component is not needed in an allied framework, since the Airforce would be the primary supplier of strategic and tactical transport. Geppert, however, sees GMSV as "reasonable", as long as the cost/effect factors are evaluated beforehand.

GGSS, the sealift component, is not in question. Both airforce and SKB think it's necessary and important, especially for logistics.

Mattiesen expands a bit on the medical side of Basis See. For him, the medical chain is important, and navy components of this chain - such as a sea-based hospital - need to have relay capability to land-based and home-based assets worked out. For the Medical Branch, their navy components - such as the MERZ containerized hospital onboard the EGVs - are primarily useful in early entry and similar missions. The primary component for the Medical Branch for longer missions however is StratAirMedEvac by their excellently-equipped A310 MedEvacs.

There is only a limited possibility for the airforce to base its assets on navy platforms. Examples named by Both there are primarily CSAR in Special Operation, but of course also specialized MedEvac helicopters.

The Joint Support Service sees the Basis See concept as "supportable" with their own forces - these would be e.g. logistics, military police, military intelligence etc. The Joint Support Service according to Geppert has apparently already started an internal evaluation of how to fit force packages to Basis See in comparison to the current land-based approach.

Part 4 will present a sealift study done for the Bundeswehr.

Basis See Conference, Pt2 : The Navy

2008-05-18T14:47:00.000-07:00

Speaches by:
Vice-Adm. Wolfgang E. Nolting : Inspector of the Navy
Flot.-Adm. Klaus von Dambrowski : Navy C4I/CD&E Staff Division Leader
Flot.-Adm. Karl-Wilhelm Ohlms : Navy Logistics Staff Division Leader

Three speaches that i've grouped together for summarization. These present the Navy point of view, primarily from the Navy planning section at the MoD.

Basis See, from the Navy point of view, has a wide mission spectrum, in particular in joint operations. Of particular value, given previous missions, is the capability for expeditionary operations without Host Nation Support. Dambrowski outlines a number of missions undertaken in the past 10 years - from evacuating troops from Somalia on frigates to disaster support in Bandah Aceh by a EGV - to underline this.

Ohlms gives a description of Basis See that i rather like - according to him, it represents an "Order of Capabilities", which forms an abstract layer between the initial mission concept and the Order of Battle. The Order of Capabilities is derived from the mission context - selecting capabilities out of what the Basis See framework offers to fit the mission - and the order of battle is subsequently derived from the Order of Capabilities - ie selecting ships that offer the selected capabilities.

There are still a number of legal problems for the German Navy when facing non-military threads such as piracy or terrorism. Both for operations inside the German EEZ - German Military may not be used internally - and in certain scenarios abroad. For example, a German ship without a parliamentary mandate can't attack a pirate ship with military means according to Nolting, who proposes a change of constitution to solve this issue - a little change to Article 87, which demands parliamentary approval for peacetime use of the military.

Nolting also notes that Basis See has one distinct plus for German foreign politics - a naval expedition reduces the dangers of being drawn into foreign conflicts in comparison to traditional ground-based peace-keeping.

Dambrowski outlines the immediate further development of Basis See: In particular, the CD&E for the "Lead from the Sea" project will be continued. Also, the recently founded NATO Center of Excellence for Operations in Confined Shallow Waters, located at Kiel, will be used as a think tank of sorts that will bring further development into Basis See.

There is a dilemma coming up in the future according to Nolting. That being keeping traditional conventional warfare capabilities despite the transformation. This is of course something that has been given thought worldwide lately - does specialization for expeditionary warfare - and in particular asymmetric warfare - cripple the navies in a potential conventional conflict. Nolting sees modularization as a possible solution, while traditional specialized units may face obsolescence.

Ohlms also sees an elementary question of mission modularity or multi-mission-capability in future platforms. He brings in the doubtful side though, citing necessary evaluation of cost, logistics and training for such mission modularity, especially when considering potentially necessary in-theater role changes. There are a number of capabilities though that can be exploited without too much of that, namely the increased usage of UUVs, UAVs and USVs from Navy platforms for a number of capabilities. For future units, there's a potential for modularization in both the K131 corvette class and the Joint Support Ship project, according to Ohlms.

Regarding expeditionary warfare, one thing is of course lacking in the German Navy, and that's an amphibious component. This amphibious component is discussed as GMSV in the Navy - Gesicherter Militärische See-Verlegefähigkeit, i.e. Secured Military Sea-Transport Capability. Dambrowski sees GMSV as a necessary component. GMSV is complemented by GGSS - commercial sealift. Both differ of course in that GGSS only offers basic transport, while GMSV has the potential to host force packages. One additional potential use for GMSV is seen in shuttling cargo between GGSS and a mission area by Dambrowski. Nolting however strictly denies that the Navy is seeking a Marine Force service, which would of course be a somewhat logical proceeding from GMSV.

Finally, there's a short introduction into the Industry/Navy relationship presented in these speaches. Apparently, this relationship currently faces some quality and competency issues due to cost-saving pressure and the public market. A possible solution for this is proposed through a sort of public-private partnership, based on the currently developing "structured dialogue" between Navy and industry. Such a public-private partnership could also be applied in other fields, in particular cross-training (to retain competency of specialized personnel) and infrastructure.

Part 3 will be the views of the other services to contrast this.

Basis See Conference, Pt1 : Politics

2008-05-18T12:57:00.000-07:00

Speaches by:
Thomas Kossendey : Deputy Secretary of Defense
Dagmar G. Wöhrl : Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Technology and "Maritime Coordinator" of the German Government

Two civilians from the German government spoke at the conference, both the deputy secretaries of their respective ministries. The below summarizes their speaches somewhat.

For the German Political Scene, Basis See is part of the ongoing transformation process to readjust the Bundeswehr to modern conflict types, including enabling the 3-Block-War concept at sea. Primarily, Basis See offers an instrument for the government to flank political and diplomatic actions through expeditionary capabilities.

Additionally, Basis See according to Kossendey can also be a viable instrument to support regional security efforts, such as the "African Ownership" concept, without leaving too much of a footprint, and without exerting too much of a visible external influence.

As part of the transformation, the Navy transitions from an Escort Navy to a modern Expeditionary Navy. This requires in particular new capabilities regarding joint operations. All modernisation of Navy equipment will be oriented towards this new capability profile. Certain elements of this, such as the third EGV, are viewed as definitely necessary among the goverment.

Wöhrl also mentions the second focal point of the new German Navy: That Germany is dependant on sea trade, and the Navy has the duty to secure sea tradelines. This is an issue that is primarily a government position, not one that came from the Navy itself.

The German maritime industry, according to Wöhrl, needs to continue consolidating itself nationally. The next step after that would be consolidation on a European basis, something that of course already started with TKMS' buying spree.

Especially for more synergy effects - and hence less costs - the government desires an increased pan-European cooperation in naval construction. However, there are of course structural and political limitations to this, and certain European Allies are "not ready yet" for such cooperation according to Wöhrl.

The Ministry of Commerce sets a target line for the German industry: Holding and if possible enlarging the German world market share. Officially, Germany holds 70% market share in submarines, and 25% export share in frigates (wonder where they got those numbers though). Also, German maritime industry will need to increase their export quota anyway, since domestic demand will be reduced in the future. Current export share of production is 70%.

Part 2 will present the Navy view of Basis See.

Not Dead Yet

2008-05-16T03:26:00.000-07:00

Just as a little inbetween update:

I'm currently working on a (lengthy) presentation of the October 2007 conference on "Basis See" hosted by Griephan Global Security and the Deutsche Marine Institut think tank.
Documentation for that conference, for a sneak preview, can be found here (in German only).

The Bundeswehrplan 2009 should be leaked sometime in the next three weeks. I'll likely put forward some stuff regarding that too, if there's anything "interesting" in there.
The official budget was hammered out last month already. In 2009, the Bundeswehr will have 30.1 billion Euro available; as a positive thing, funding for the new aircraft of the Flugbereitschaft (couple A319 and A340, as well as Bombardier 5000, total about 1.4 billion euro) will not be drawn from the Bundeswehr budget.

50-year aniversary of joint German-British navy training in Plymouth sometime around now. F219 Sachsen is part of the Weekly War there this week.

The first German K130 corvette Braunschweig was commissioned last month. Currently participating in the Mare Aperto maneuvers off Sicily with her squadron tender Donau.

Eight German ships (three minehunters, two frigates, one FAC, two auxiliaries) just returned from taking part in NATO maneuver JOINT WARRIOR off Scotland training asymmetric and mine warfare scenarios. Part of the scenario is protecting an oil platform against attacking insurgents in small aircraft, dinghis, speedboats and even jetskis.
Other scenarios included attack from land, some ASW, and more specific air threats.

NH90 NFH (MH-90) is getting some criticism for delays lately. MoD is supposedly looking for alternatives.
Somewhat interesting in that regard, JOINT WARRIOR apparently saw a British Merlin operating from a German frigate (more than just crossdecking, the relevant article says "air operations").

Other than that, not really much news regarding the German Navy out there.

HiTaTa 2008

2008-01-17T09:36:00.001-08:00

Last week saw the 48th annual "Historic-Tactical Conference" of the German Navy, and this event always brings forth a wealth of information about the German Navy to the public.

I haven't gone through everything yet, but i'll do some random highlights from the three speeches i've read:

OAE saw a German P-3C operating with it "for several weeks" (and 26 operational flights); it has now officially reached IOC.
UNIFIL Command will be transferred from Germany to the Italian-led EUROMARFOR on March 1st. Germany will reduce its contribution (details not known yet), and FGS Hessen (a Type 124) is planned for the first rotation.
OEF will see another German frigate for the next rotation, after that the "target" is to replace it with a P-3C as a "equivalent replacement" (as i expected).
FOC for the Type 124 AAW FFGs is "likely pushed back to first half of 2010" due to the software problems; nevertheless, two of the three frigates will be "operational" this year, with the third being retained for software testing.
EAV cruise 2008 also includes multiple PASSEX with the USN and Finnish Navy (in addition to the already known ones with India and France).
Random tidbit: Good Hope III will involve 14 Kormoran II missiles fired at the EAV ships; additionally, for the first time in years, naval helicopters will live-fire Sea Skua in this exercise.
Northern Coasts 2007 was received very well with all contributing nations, and all have signed back up for the 2008 version; the exercise will also replace large-scale national maneuvers for the Swedish and Finnish Navies.
Apparently, there are some 30 "points of contestion" about the K130 still, which is why they haven't been commissioned yet. However, they are "hopeful that the first will be commissioned during this quarter".
The DM2A4 torpedo has been officially cleared for the Navy (after exercises last year), and the first live-fire shooting in commission is planned for IV/2008.
German Sea King helicopters are receiving a "tactical support capability" for Special Forces, with the basics tested during Northern Coasts.
Vice-Admiral Nolting is mulling buying two new AOs to replace FGS Spessart and FGS Rhön (in addition to any new EGVs).
The F125 project is getting a dedicated taskgroup at the ministry that will try to prevent the same kind of problems popping up with F124 and K130 and is supposed to "keep the initiative with the Bundeswehr".
The "Military Sealift Requirement" of Basis See was apparently hammered out at "around 800 soldiers and their equipment" as a "realistic size" - in order to support a EU Battlegroup, or for evacuation operations. Note that this is the entire requirement, not for a single ship. And doesn't say anything about the type of ship (LPD/LHD/T-AKE style military RoRo)
Apparently the new Concept for "Basis See" includes a requirement for TBMD in it somewhere. Urgh.

Command from the Sea

2008-01-12T12:52:00.001-08:00

In September 2007, the German Navy tested a project outlined in "Basis See" - using naval assets as offshore command bases for land forces.

This concept testing project was started in 2005 already, and now culminated in a Exercise with a defined scenario that would be an application of "Basis See":
About 50 military advisors stuck in a erupting civil war zone have to be evacuated, and, as there are no available forward land bases for an operation, the Division of Special Operations will have to perform this operation from the Type 123 frigate Bayern.
The necessary Heer planning and command staff for this operation was airlifted to the frigate, and set up camp aboard with support by the Navy, planning out the evacuation operation.

The primary point of this experiment was to prove the viability of a "forward command post" onboard a existing navy unit. The Type 123 frigates offer enough space for an additional 20 men living and working for this task onboard without limiting the ship's own crew. As this is far below the company-sized regular command setup for such operations, the forward command staff heavily depends on communications with further staff at home. This experiment in September primarily tested the viability of setting up this command post, setting up a Army C3 IT System (FüInfoSysH) onboard the ship, and establishing and maintaining communications with command staff at home via HF radio and SHF-Satcom. Planned future experiments in the same direction will extend on maintaining and improving this communications route.

The next test will be in April this year onboard another F123 frigate, Brandenburg. The target is to get a Standard Operations Procedure (SOP) manual ready for actual operations by mid-2008, and introducing "Command from the Sea" as a new capability for the German Navy by then.

More Russian-German Cooperation

2008-01-11T15:08:00.000-08:00

In civilian shipping, commercial "classification agencies" run registers of ships sorted into various classes (e.g. by size), and provide technical oversight and surveys of all ships on their register. "Classification" is required to enter any territorial waters in the EU for example, for safety concerns. Also, this is usually required to obtain any insurance for a ship.

In total, there are only 40 such agencies worldwide, with ten of them operating internationally and acknowledging each others registers as "valid"; these ten are organized in the IACS organization.

Now, two of these ten agencies within the IACS are the German "Germanischer Lloyd" (GL) and the state-run Russian "Maritime Register of Shipping" (RS).

Germany and Russia signed several contracts over the last six months.

Part of these is among other things that GL will closely cooperate with the St Petersburg Maritime University, one of the best maritime engineering universities worldwide.

Additionally, and that's the big thing, GL and RS will be mutually able to operate in each other's country. That means that Germans and Russians will - to some extent - supervise each other's shipbuilding industry, maritime safety, and technical upkeep in the civilian maritime sector in the future.

A big step.

German Deployments Update

2008-01-10T09:58:00.000-08:00

I did a post back in October on current German deployments.

Guess it's time for a little update there, especially quite a number of ships have rotated since then.

MTF448 (UNIFIL)

FGS Bayern (F217) - since Oct 07, CTG

FGS Werra (A514) - since Jan 08, FAC Castle at Limassol
FGS Puma (P1622) - rotated in Nov 07
FGS Zobel (P1625) - rotated in Nov 07

FGS Auerbach/Oberpfalz (M1093) - rotated in Sep 07
FGS Überherrn (M1095) - rotated in Sep 07

Didn't list the two MCM vessels in the last post since i was somewhat in doubt as to their actual deployment; they are not covered by the current doctrine (1 FFG + 2 FAC), and are likely to return this or next month at the latest anyway.

The two FACs might be in for a one-year tour with a "wet" crew switch again - though we won't know that before May or so.

CTF150 (Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa)

FGS Augsburg (F213) - since Sep 07, until about Feb 08

Operation Active Endeavour

FGS Alster (A50) - has been spotted in Malta a few days ago

Both submarines previously assigned returned in December. In my opinion though we're likely to see another Type 212A assigned sometime later this year again. The presence of Alster, like with her sisters, is hushed down as usual - but we can expect one of the three surveillance ships in the area at all times pretty much, also to support MTF448.

SNMG2 in the Mediterranean will apparently have multiple 3-week detachments supporting OAE as well during the next 6 months; Niedersachsen (below) is earmarked for two such detachments already.

Standing NATO fleets:

SNMG1 - FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F209), since Nov 07
SNMG2 - FGS Niedersachsen (F208), since Jan 08

SNMCMG1 - FGS Weilheim (M1059), since Jan 08
SNMCMG2 - contribution inactive, since Jul 07

Training Cruises

FGS Hamburg (F220)
FGS Köln (F211)
FGS Berlin (A1411)
FGS Westerwald (A1435)

See this post for details on the primary EAV cruise this year.

Several other ships currently "inactive" (below) will presumably host further EAV activities over the next 6 months - in particular Hessen and Karlsruhe are likely there.

Recently returned from deployments

FGS Lübeck (F214) - from MTF448, late Nov 07
FGS Emden (F210) - from FOST at Plymouth, mid Dec 07

Scheduled for Marinearsenal

FGS Bremen (F207) - for overhaul starting around Feb 08

Recently returned from Marinearsenal

FGS Hessen (F221) - around mid Jan 08
FGS Karlsruhe (F212) - around mid Dec 07

Now, while putting the above list together, i tried to track down the other frigates. Without much success so far - i know two have been around Wilhelmshaven during the last few months, while with the other two i'm at a loss. Not that there are many left really - only four out of 15 frigates are missing, and that should say something about the workload of German ships.

Update:

FGS Brandenburg (F215) - scheduled trials in April, so she's around home
FGS Schleswig-Holstein (F216) - scheduled yard time

Under contracted-out repair work at Peene-Werft, Wolgast:
FGS Grömitz (M1064)
FGS Frettchen (P6126)
Both damaged in accidents last year.

Contribution

2008-01-10T02:19:00.000-08:00

The German Navy is finally contributing a frigate to a Standing NATO fleet again - Niedersachsen is about to join SNMG2 in Turkey.

For over a year, due to the high national use of the frigates, the Marine wasn't able - or willing - to contribute any combat ships to SNMG1 and SNMG2 and instead had the two civilian-crewed AOs Spessart and Rhön support the two fleets.
This changed with Sachsen joining SNMG1 in January 2007, followed by Rheinland-Pfalz in that group. SNMG2 had Rhön assigned to it until late December.

SNMG2's primary task over the next six months will be to support Operation Active Endeavour in patrolling the Eastern and Central Mediterranean.

Short news from the rumour mill...

2008-01-08T06:34:00.000-08:00

... have a new date for the commissioning of the K130 Corvette Braunschweig.

April 2008.

Apparently she ran aground while transiting the Kiel Canal, resulting in damage to her propellers.

Braunschweig is currently officially still "on trials" under military authority (or rather, classified a non-navy government vessel) since being handed over by TKMS in 2006 after sea trials. The "prototype" of the K130 class - as she's been referred to by her Captain - was originally supposed to be commissioned in May 2007.

EAV Tour 2008

2008-01-05T09:38:00.000-08:00

"EAV" is the German Training Cruise Flotilla, setting out yearly to train new officer cadets. This year - leaving Germany on January 15th - the cruise will go a bit further than usual. The EAV for 2008 consists of the Type 124 frigate FGS Hamburg (F 220), Type 122 frigate FGS Köln (F 211), and the Type 702 AOR FGS Berlin (A 1411).

The tour, this year, will first set out for Accra, Ghana to the Gulf of Guinea - where the African Partnership Station Initiative is active - then go on towards South Africa.

Around Namibia, the flotilla will meet up with the ammunition RAS ship FGS Westerwald (A 1435), and will enter the month-long maneuver series "Good Hope III" along with German airforce units and the South-African Navy and Airforce off the coast of South Africa. The German airforce units includes aircraft from Recon Wing 51, the Luftwaffe Tornado wing tasked with Naval Strike missions, and "Good Hope III" will primarily focus on air-defence scenarios and joint operations.

After a visit Port Louis, Mauritius, the flotilla then continues on to Kochi in India, where further joint maneuvers will be held with the Indian Navy to "strengthen the ties between the German and Indian Navies".

The flotilla will then traverse the Fifth Fleet AoR, with a visit to Oman, and transfer to the Mediterranean through Suez. In the Mediterranean, in a sort of tradition for the EAV, a further two weeks of joint maneuvers with the French Marine Nationale are scheduled, before the ships return to Germany with some side visits to Spain, the UK and Ireland.

The whole cruise will take about 6 months.

NoCo 2007 - New Name, Same Thing

2007-12-17T15:43:00.000-08:00

The German Luftwaffe's Operational Staff Airforce just completed exercise "Kalkar Sky 2007".

This was a comparable small exercise by numbers of people involved, however a somewhat important one - the task was to install and operate a Combined Joint Forces Air Command HQ (no, you don't want to know the German term for that), command forces enforcing a simulated no-flight-zone, coordinate tactical air transport, SAR, MEDEVAC etc pp. The usual things. Primarily a test of newly acquired C3I IT equipment and "deployable HQ structures", btw.

The interesting part? The scenario.

It involves Amberland and Beachland, a former war leading to a just-beginning peace-keeping & -enforcing EU/NATO mission, a no-flight zone installed over the disputed territories,
a fundamentalist separatist group in the disputed territories operating with terrorist tactics, the whole thing turning into a limited asymmetric war zone...

Right. That's exactly the Northern Coast 2007 OPGEN scenario, with the focus here being on the airforce assets instead of the Navy.

I'd actually love to see this scenario develop. Update it a bit, say every 3 or 4 months, with OPFOR info from Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon (all three of which are in there), as well as other intel, and let it run its course with regular maneuvers over the next couple years. As long as there are good storyboard writers in the background, this could turn out interesting.

Fully Operational?

2007-12-17T14:55:00.000-08:00

Since their commissioning, the three Type 124 AAW frigates have been wrought with one little problem - their FCS software is incompatible. This is the result of ordering the ships from three different yards, and splitting FCS installation along with the contract (something that will not be repeated with Type 125). The incompatibility isn't visible at first - each ship funtions perfectly well, as long as it's on its own. However, the three ships are not able to share battlefield information among each other beyond standard Link-11 datalink messaging. Which effectively means that they cannot form a joint AAW battlespace.

The problem has been known for over a year now. It pretty much popped up after the second Type 124 commissioned. And they're still working on fixing it, with about any attempt short of ripping out the entire system on all three ships. What adds time to is that the three frigates are doing their regular training; the Marine just keeps them "close" and doesn't send them on deployments. By most accounts, the problem "should be solved" next year.

Last week, the Type 124 frigate Hamburg completed the German Operational Sea Training. The GOST is held in a NATO framework at Plymouth under Royal Navy auspices every year. It lasts 6 weeks and effectively trains every part of the ship's crew in full wartime operations; this includes live-fire exercises, firefighting/damage control, and other scenarios, and is finished with the "Weekly War", a full War scenario for a flotilla.

Now, both her sisters, Sachsen and Hessen, completed the same in the years before as flagships of small flotillas. What's different about Hamburg is that she's now actually going to be deployed next year. Not to one of the full deployments (UNIFIL and TF150), but as leader of the EAV - the German training cruise flotilla, which will also include Type 122 frigate Köln and a AOR. In previous times, when a Type 124 lead the EAV, such cruises were short due to above software problems - North Sea, North Atlantic, Mediterranean perhaps.

This time, the three ships will "visit three continents, do live-fire exercises in South Africa, and do joint maneuvers with the South-African and Indian Navies as well as navies of other NATO partners". In short: It'll pretty much revisit SNMG1's cruise around Africa - with a stint across the Indian Ocean as well.

It'll be interesting to see how Hamburg will perform on this cruise. And how much it will be covered publicly. Especially when it enters the TF150 AoR.

Modern Naval Fire Support

2007-12-14T06:51:00.001-08:00

TKMS, in its latest release on the F125, has confirmed planned integration of ADLER-II/ASCA into the ship's FCS. A little thing that popped up somewhere in the middle of the text, without much fanfare. And as I understand it, the integration is not just for a proprietary system with an ASCA interface, but full-scale ADLER-II integration.

Now what does that mean? Simple - ASCA is an interface protocol for NATO artillery C2I systems, here in particular the German Army's ADLER-II artillery combat network. ADLER-II provides information distribution, establishment of the battlefield situation, full fire direction and fire control capability for all connected units, and the necessary calculation routines regarding weapon and ammunition selection based on target, weather, geological information and other parameters.

ASCA itself is a joint protocol also allowing the ADLER-II network nodes - and the F125 - to be networked with other Artillery C2I systems, such as the US AFATDS system.
This integration is on some levels similar to the USN Naval Fire Control System (NFCS), although NFCS requires some more complicated local problem resolvement.

This integration will allow a F125 offshore to act within the battlefield network as "just another" artillery gun - available to the artillery network without complication, and capable of providing naval fire support as directed by standard Army forward artillery observers.

What will be interesting is whether they'll integrate the RBS-15 Mk4 missiles into the network as well - it's currently being done for GMLRS missiles on Germany's MARS launchers, so guided systems are definitely not out. Shouldn't be that much trouble, as the Mk4 system is still under early development, and would be a real force multiplier on a tactic-strategic level.

Where are the Corvettes?

2007-12-14T03:05:00.000-08:00

The new German K130 "corvette" class (at 1,840 tons, they're light frigates in reality) has received a lot of hype from the German Navy.

However, it seems as though their introduction is turning into a long, drawn-out affair. Originally, it was planned to commission the first two corvettes in 2007, with the other three following in 2008.

To be more exact, F260 Braunschweig was supposed to commission in May 2007, F261 Magdeburg sometime around July. Then May came around, and the Navy pushed commissioning dates back to "Summer 2007" for both ships. Understandable, as Braunschweig did have some problems during her early sea trials - including damaging her screws on a high-speed run.

Then "Summer 2007" rolled around. And where are the corvettes? Well, on trials. Still. They were also not commissioned in Autumn '07. F260 Braunschweig was originally planned for the Northern Coasts 2007 exercise, back in late October (and this was still the plan in September, one of the backposted potential commissioning dates). As she apparently wasn't ready, she was struck from that exercise.

Actually, they're nowhere around their future squadron's homeport, Warnemünde on the Baltic Sea, even - both ships tend to hang around Kiel and in particular Wilhelmshaven lately, the sites of the two Marinearsenal navy yards. Sometimes in other ports for trials, e.g. in Eckernförde (the German submarine force homeport). Occasionally they seem to go to sea for trials, or are used in port shows - but not much else.

There are some rumours that F260 Braunschweig is still supposed to commission this year - though, considering there's only like two weeks left of that year, that's really rather doubtful.

The construction goes on nonetheless. All five corvettes have now been christened and launched, the last one (F264 Ludwigshafen) on September 26th. All corvettes already carry their armament - even Ludwigshafen is being shown with her forward RAM and 76mm displayed proudly.

And even the training of future crews is ongoing. This is done "dry" on a full replica of the stations at the Marinetechnikschule in Stralsund. This has been going on since at least July with two technical crew being trained.

So where's the delay? Some critical failure in building? Engine problems? One can only wonder...

Entering Combat ... though not in the South

2007-11-09T15:59:00.000-08:00

Since late October, German forces in Afghanistan have been involved in Operation "Harekate Yolo II", in some cases seeing heavy fighting. This lasted about two weeks, and has only since last week slowly surfaced.

The operation is a joint NATO effort to regain control of the provinces Badghis and Farjab in north-west Afghanistan. Badghis is part of the Italian Regional Command (West) and Farjab lies next to it in the German Regional Command (North) zone.

Over a few previous weeks, Taliban forces had apparently overrun several districts in both provinces, attacking police stations and local security forces, and taking some measure of control in Badghis province in the Italian zone. There, Taliban units also blocked the "Ring Road" which connects all major Afghan cities. Estimates talk about around organized Taliban units numbering around 300 men in the area, with "not only light weapons".

The primary unit in the operation is the 209th Afghan National Army Corps with up to 900 soldiers deployed, along with its embedded Bundeswehr advisors. Germany also supplied recon forces, medical support and logistics units with up to 300 soldiers deployed. Additionally, some 260 Norwegian soldiers were deployed (including the RC(N) QRF from Mazar-e-Sharif), as well as Italian units and other, smaller NATO groups. The German Regional Command under Brigade General Dieter Warnecke, who lead this operation for ISAF, was forward-deployed to Maimaneh in Farjab province, where the Norwegian PRT is located. RC(N) units were not only deployed in Farjab, but, for some time, also out-of-area in Badghis in the Italian zone.

Fighting to regain Badghis province was apparently heavy. For Norway, newspaper Aftenposten cites the Norwegian Commander that last monday's fighting was the heaviest Norwegian units have been involved in since WW2. No NATO casualties in connection with this operation have so far been reported though.

Apparently, several times, air strikes had to be ordered to support ground forces, in one case killing a high Taliban commander according to NATO (and some civilians by unaccounted Afghan sources). These strikes were directed by German or Norwegian advisors accompanying the Afghan forces. In another case, Norwegian Forces had to call in airstrikes as they came under mortar fire from fortified Taliban positions. German Tornado Recce assets were also heavily used in the operation.

After about two weeks, the operation was declared over last week; German and Norwegian units withdrew back from Badghis to Farjab. Badghis was declared in a "state of consolidation", with other NATO troops stabilizing it, and Afghan forces supposed to take back over "in a few weeks".

Taliban troops in the area are of course not beaten yet. Taliban Commander Mansur Dadullah announced a "new front" in the North a week ago, and yesterday in Farjab, Norwegian forces that were involved in the operation suffered one fatality and one injured from a roadside bomb attack.
Pressure on the region has been increasing over the last two months; German troops had already been involved in - less violent - joint operations with ANA units in the eastern part of its zone. The reason for this increase in pressure is a power vacuum created by the local Warlord General Dostum losing influence and money.

Norway is - in light of this and planned future operations - currently increasing its deployment to Afghanistan, with an extra 50 military advisors for the ANA, and a 150-strong combat company with 2-3 helicopters planned for early 2008. These are specifically planned to "increase presence" in RC(N) and will bring the Norwegian deployment to 700 soldiers total. Germany still has a buffer of about 350 soldiers available in its recently extended mandate in addition to the deployed 3,150 soldiers. Defence Minister Jung announced late October that German military advisor numbers to the ANA would be "tripled". The rest of the buffer - about 250 soldiers - will be filled by German troops replacing 240 Danish and Czech troops in the North. A related measure is probably also that six CH-53 - long planned - finally transferred last week from Task Unit Termez/Uzbekistan to Task Unit Mazar-e-Sharif.

The recent fighting - also in the South and East - is some of the last major operations on both sides before the Afghan Winter will grind everything to a halt later this month. It'll be interesting to see what will happen in spring.

A reiteration of "Basis See"

2007-11-01T03:57:00.000-07:00

As it's popped up around a couple forums, a reiteration of the concept.

The concept intends not to build a taskforce around a single base unit, but to assemble a taskforce in which every ship provides specific capabilities.

Within the stabilization forces (as these are the more interesting ones for "Basis See"):

Type 125 FFG: C3, MIO base, Land Attack, ASuW, Escort, transport/ASW/SAR (2 helos)
Type 143A FAC: ASuW, Escort, Patrol (Link 11/Palis CMS)
Type 212A SSK: Patrol/Surveillance, ASW, ASuW, SOF
Type 332 MCMV: Minehunting (Penguin B3 UUV)
Type 333 MCMV: Minehunting (Seefuchs I UUV), Patrol (Link 11/Palis CMS)
Type 352 MCMV: Minesweeping (Seehund USV), Patrol (Link 11/Palis CMS)
Type 404 AGS: supply, limited C3, maintenance
Type 702 AOR: supply, limited C3, medical, transport (78 TEU), evacuation (450 PX), transport/ASW/SAR (2 helos)
P-3C MPA: Patrol/Surveillance, ASuW, ASW

In the up-downward 3-tier system, the Intervention Forces lend downward support for AAW and ASW in particular, the Support Forces lend upward support with towing, supply, transport etc.

Within "Basis See", units out of the above are attached as needed.

The F125 in particular is not intended as a "mothership" of any sorts, nor is it intended to optionally have the capabilities that other units within the "Basis See" provide. The A702 EGVs have far more of such a "multi-role base" role.

Praising Continuity

2007-10-29T14:51:00.000-07:00

Yesterday, Frank-Walter Steinmeier was elected vice-chairman of the Social-Democrat Party of Germany. Now, of course, this candidate isn't just anybody - he's the current German Foreign Minister.

His speech at the party summit, before being elected, summarized his intentions with regard to foreign policy quite easily - continue what we're doing, and balance our way through the international scene.

One particular project of his - sanctioned by the Chancellor - is the attempt to form a strategic partnership with Russia. He describes this as a "key question" for both Germany, the European Union, and beyond, and goes on to say that Russia - despite some "frustrations" - is a key to maintaining international stability.
Steinmeier's main "keystone" is "energy foreign politics", ie securing energy resources for Germany and the European Union. To him, "global security" means "energy security" foremost - hence a concentration of foreign policy on establishing the necessary ties to secure ressources.

Something that the German Foreign Ministry sort of highlighted last year is that "a lot" of areas German soldiers are operating in are potential energy ressource providers. The Northern areas that Germany commands and attempts to stabilize in Afghanistan - in particular the Jowzjan province - have natural gas fields, with the production facilities were destroyed in the 80s. There are German soldiers in Uzbekistan already, and Turkmenistan "looks interesting". Georgia, as an important future transit country of oil from Azerbaidjan, has a German military observer mission. In Sudan, where Germany has some 75 soldiers, Germany is supporting the oil-rich Southern rebels - and German companies are already planning "alternative" routes for Sudanese oil through "safe" Kenya.

The unilateral cancelling of the treaties that ended the Cold War - CFE, INF etc - by both Russia and the USA is something seen "with great concern". Germany is working on several initiatives regarding international disarmament, in particular with the renewal of the NPT, and these actions are rather "disruptive".
The US missile shield is a project Steinmeier sees "with concern" due to its repercussions on stability in Europe with regard to Russia - hence it's something technically - in the current "version" - opposed by Germany.
In recent months, Steinmeier has repeatedly talked about "renewing" and "redeepening" the relationship with the USA. However, recent US foreign policy (threatening with "WW3" and "military options") is something that has been sharply criticized by Germany.

Steinmeier - and the SPD - support Turkey in entering the European Union, in particular as Germany has had a considerable Turkish minority for the last 40 years. However, any kind of military escalation on the Turkish-Iraqi border is something also seen "with great concern". Iran is seen as another "keystone" in German politics in that area - including as a potential guarantor to peace and stability in areas where Germany is involved - Lebanon/Syria, and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a topic by itself really. The direction aimed for by Steinmeier - and hence, Germany - is to reduce OEF soldiers in favour of ISAF, stabilizing the region Germany is operating in (instead of patrolling the coast of Somalia). Withdrawing from Afghanistan is out of the question.

The one bloc that has seen changes recently is the treatment of China - that relation has cooled down significantly from the 2002/2003 times of open political cooperation. Germany has just been officially visited by the Dalai Lama - and Uyghur dissidents will also soon officially visit the Chancellor. China is of course reacting to this with the usual diplomatic inconveniences - which Germany fully returns. It will be interesting to see this developing.

Current German Navy Deployments

2007-10-27T12:21:00.000-07:00

To the best of my knowledge. Notably absent from any of the deployments are both Berlin class AORs (update: found one of them, Berlin, see below).

MTF 448 (UNIFIL)

Mandate recently renewed; drawdown to one frigate, one tender and two to four smaller units.

FGS Bayern (F217)
FGS Donau (A516)

Rotating In:
FGS S72 Puma (P6122)
FGS S75 Zobel (P6125)

Rotating Out:
FGS Lübeck (F214) (late October)
FGS Kulmbach (M1091) (early November)
FGS Ensdorf (M1094) (early November)

CTF 150 (Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa)

FGS Augsburg (F213)

TFE (Operation Active Endeavour)

FGS U18
FGS U33
FGS Oker (A53)

SNMG1

FGS Spessart (A1442)

SNMG2

FGS Rhön (A1443)

SNMCMG1

FGS Datteln (M1068)

SNMCMG2

German contribution inactive since July 07.
Original planning: FGS Kulmbach, now in MTF 448.

Northern Coast 2007

Exercise finished 10/26, mission drawing down.

Rotating Out:
FGS Hessen (F221)
FGS Bremen (F207)
FGS U23
FGS U32
FGS S78 Ozelot (P6128)
FGS Dillingen (M1065)
FGS Bad Rappenau (M1067)
FGS Alster (A50)
FGS Werra (A514)
FGS Ammersee (A1425)
FGS Tegernsee (A1426)
FGS Westerwald (A1435)
FGS Fehmarn (A1458)
FGS Spiekeroog (A1452)

Training Cruises

FGS Gorch Fock - enroute from Halifax
FGS Hamburg (F220) - currently in Devonport
FGS U15 - currently in Devonport
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F209) - returning from UK

Docked in Marinearsenal

Ships in regular/irregular maintenance, only those with known data.

FGS Karlsruhe (F212) - planned till November
FGS S74 Nerz (P6124) - as of early October
FGS Berlin (A1411) - planned till mid-November

NBC on the Rise?

2007-10-27T02:59:00.000-07:00

NBC Counter Warfare has been scaled back to next to zero in Western countries since the end of the Cold War. Especially since shortly after the Gulf War, no one has been interested in it - threat dealt with, no more money. Even though OIF in 2003 again saw deployment of specialized units (both by the USA and Germany), existing equipment was deemed enough for that purpose. This is particularly interesting as NATO in 2002 committed its "Prague Initiatives for NBC Defense" which were supposed to increase capability in this field. The German take on the components of that NATO initiative pretty much was "we already have that, now shut up". Ok, not really, but it appears to have developed along those lines.

Germany has, since the end of the 90s, scaled down its active capabilities in that field effectively to only two battalions (from seven), two companies (mostly for training) and a few spread-out platoons.
Procurement of new decontamination equipment (TEP-90) has been postponed for the last 15 years now, with only some units equipped, still leaving the decon platoons with the good old Cold War equipment from the mid-70s that was already breaking down constantly when i worked with it 8 years ago. Same for the Fuchs/Fox, which is pretty much a 60s APC equipped with "cutting-edge" early 80s electronics (late 80s in the US Fox).

Now, suddenly, there seems to be interest again. Germany now holds yearly large-scale exercises (codenamed Golden Mask, with 800+ soldiers each time), but these are mostly intended to prepare the NATO Response Force CBRN Defence Battalions, and to train civil-military cooperation in that area a bit. And there's suddenly orders for equipment:

Rheinmetall reports an entire series of orders for their NBC detection equipment, to the tune of about €25 million. Sounds low - as military orders go - but for this money, Germany and the USA are upgrading 37 and 18 Fuchs/Fox mobile NC detectors respectively. For scale: 18 Fuchs are the entire recon component of a mixed NBC Battalion. Additionally, Germany has ordered a prototype for a bio-warfare analysis laboratory on a Yak armored truck (a Duro 3), something that Germany so far hasn't had in mobile form. Switzerland is buying prototypes for a future series of 12 mobile NBC analysis laboratories.
For the near future, Rheinmetall expects follow-up orders (with the prototypes, and more upgrades) for over €50 million.

Interesting that this suddenly pops up like this.

Splitting Forces

2007-10-17T16:08:00.000-07:00

I've mentioned in some other places how the F125 project is part of a very specific effort for specific tasks. Thought I'd expand on that a bit...

The Bundeswehr, in 2003, started a transformation process. The end result of this transformation process will be essentially a three-tier military formed around specific tasks.

The first tier are the Intervention Forces, a core military force of 35,000 combat personnel that will be equipped with top notch equipment, and will be specifically trained for a peace-enforcing role. That is, overpowering an enemy, quickly, with superior technology primarily. This core military force will have about 2 divisions in ground forces available, as well as a modern full-spectrum naval taskforce, and appropriate airforce support for anything that's needed.

The second tier are the socalled Stabilization Forces, which pretty much rely on manpower, and are trained and equipped to handle peace-keeping missions. They will have about 5 divisions in ground forces, a navy taskforce specifically built up around their task, and some serious air support when needed.

The third tier are the Support Forces - pretty much anything that doesn't fit directly into the forward- or rear-echelon combat parts of the first two tiers. The wider logistics scale, infrastructure - including forward bases -, maintenance units, anything that's stationary in Germany, and, pretty important too, all training. This tier supports the other two in their operations, and also provides other, secondary functions also in the civilian world such as for example SAR or VIP transport.

It's actually a rather radical idea to put up the forces along these lines - however, for Germany, it provides the opportunity to streamline their forces their along multinational contribution requirements, to streamline the already low conscript usage by the military - by building "usable" units completely devoid of conscripts - and to streamline funding of course along priorities.

So, the F125. Well, let's first expand on what the navy contributes where according to 2003 data:

Intervention Forces: 3 F124 (AAW), 4 F123 (ASW), 5 K130 (ASuW), 4 U212A (SSK), 6 MCMV, 3 aux
Stabilization Forces: 8 F122 (ASW), 10 S143A (FAC), 4 U206A (SSK), 9 MCMV, up to 6 aux, 10 MPA
Support Forces: all civilian-manned auxiliaries

The F125 is the replacement for the F122 class. It's also the first step at redefining the outfit of the Stabilization Forces in order to make it fit its task.

The long-term plan for the Stabilization Forces is now shaping out to look like this:

4 F125 as "cores" for taskforces, primary role maritime interdiction/land attack; 2014+
6 K131 corvettes, role yet to be defined, replace FACs; 2020+
2-4 U212A submarines, modified for recon/surveillance/SOF role; 2012+
9 MCM units; from existing stock
2 JSS cargo/sealift ships, design yet to be defined, new capability; 2020+
2 AOR; second carrying a containerized joint command center, 2013+
3-4 tenders; from existing stock
8 MPA; for the medium-term, the P-3C recently bought used

These Stabilization Forces have a very broad taskset. One that doesn't really include "traditional" conventional naval warfare though - that's what the Intervention Forces fleet is for. The taskset will be to patrol embargoes, patrol coastal areas, support land-based peacekeeping forces, general littoral-only warfare, SOF support, limited tactical land attack. Within their spectrum, they're capable of dealing with ASW (via helo/MPA/subs), MW and ASuW threats, for AAW beyond self-defence land-based fighters (roughly 2-4 squadrons within the Stabilization Forces) or the Intervention Forces have to lend lateral assistance.

Within that roleset, the F125 outfit - relatively low, special armament, relatively large design, high endurance, small commando carrier - make a lot of sense. The future K131 corvette class will be used to fill holes in the concept, with the design or role to be defined sometime over the next 10 years.

Working in the Background

2007-10-14T05:49:00.000-07:00

The Baltic Sea, in recent times, has become somewhat more of a potential low-conflict zone. This, of course, because of the Joint German-Russian pipeline that is supposed to run through it, and for which construction is supposed to start next year already.

The big point for other nations is where this pipeline is supposed to run, and who will tend to it once operational. Russia has stated that the Russian Baltic Fleet will be used to protect the pipeline - something Sweden deeply opposes, as this would permanently place the Baltic Fleet just right outside of Sweden's 12-mile zone. In the south, disputed territory between Denmark and Poland in the sea has lead to the pipeline being rerouted through non-disputed waters. And in the north, of course, Estonia is refusing to have it run through its waters, so there's another detour there. And Poland of course is simply calling the pipeline "the new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" (aka "Hitler-Stalin Pact"), because it will make it possible for Russia to cut gas to Poland without affecting Western Europe. Finland is cooperating with Germany and Russia - they're completely dependant on Russian gas anyway, and are getting a new direct spin-off from this pipeline out of it.

Germany has so far pretty much not commented on such security and conflict considerations. However, there's work going on in the background, somewhat silently. It might also be that this actually "conveniently" drowned somewhat in news of Russia testing new bombs, reactivating naval aircraft patrols and such around the same time.

On September 14th, the German and Russian Navy signed a bilateral cooperation treaty (i.e. outside existing NATO PfP arrangements) to "improve joint operations against new threats". This was followed by a 4-day visit visit of the Baltic Fleet Commander, Vice-Admiral Sidenko, to the German Fleet Commander, Vice-Admiral Stricker, on October 10th now, with a little tour through commands and some squadrons. Of course, officially, this visit runs under NATO PfP of course, but it's an interesting coincidence.

Of course it all just ties into a bigger picture. The German and Russian Navy have cooperated closely since 2006. Germany got the Baltic Fleet into the annual Open Spirits minehunting operation since then, integrating them closer with NATO navies in the area. Ships of the Baltic Fleet have paid friendly visits to German events in 2007 - such as a Neustrashimy at the Kieler Woche - and Russian and German rear-echelon officials have exchanged concepts and ideas with regard to coastal security and environmental protection since 2006.

All little things, which don't really pop up in the news. But things that could be interesting when considering the future - post-2010 - security environment of the Baltic Sea region.

Concept Testing, Part 2

2007-10-11T03:59:00.000-07:00

I've by now actually read the scenario outlines for NOCO '07. These are actually available declassified through the English Marine.de article on the exercise.

The exercise, to hype realism, is rather complicated. It involves a multitude of tasks, both symmetric and asymmetric, for the employed forces within an environment that involves five virtual countries.

The biggest part is probably the final exercise Honest Mediator from October 21st to 25th. It will involve:

- multiple symmetric air threats (Tornados)
- multiple asymmetric air threats (Pilatus, T17, light helos)
- asymmetric subscenarios (terrorists, pirates) including hostile EW and IEDs
- maritime interdiction operations (against smugglers)
- MIW operations (ocean sweeping, harbour demining, EOD at sea - with hostile mine laying both by ships and subs)
- special forces usage against coastal targets (from a U212A submarine)
- ASW operations (against the U206A and the Gotland)
- convoy escort missions (including of course incidents)
- other events: disaster relief, riot control in port and at sea, land-side attacks on ports

And the whole thing wrapped into a background involving a recent (and still hot) ceasefire between two warring nations, and NATO forces moving in peacekeepers via sealift.
The force protection requirements for involved units read almost as if they're holding this exercise somewhere in the Gulf.

Concept Testing

2007-10-10T14:32:00.000-07:00

Just as the NATO CoE for Littoral Warfare (I don't think they really expect anyone to say "operations in confined and shallow waters") in Germany is slowly starting work and establishing itself, Germany already engages in the first maneuver coached and inspired by this CoE.

And what a maneuver it is. Probably one of the biggest joint maneuvers in years. And by big I really mean big. I'm rather surprised at the numbers, so i better repeat that.

The name is Northern Coasts, short NOCO, and this will be a new ongoing multi-national exercise series happening annually. For Germany, the deployment for this multi-national exercise will replace the national SEF training exercises. The focus will be on large-scale interoperability between Allied navies and land and air forces, just as the new Navy doctrine prescribes.

In 2007, the focus is joint navy-airforce operations , with some ground force involvement as well, in a realistic scenario (deployment on UN ticket in a interstate conflict background). The scenario will involve certain component tasks of "Basis See", e.g. embargo enforcement, convoy escort and humanitarian assistance. And, from the ships involved, there'll also a rather hefty MIW and ASW part. The exercise will take place in the Western Baltic Sea and last a full two weeks (October 12th to 25th).

The line-up on the German side includes one F124 AAW frigate, one F122 ASW frigate, one ELINT ship, two minehunters (one of which has been refitted as a "guard ship" - a gunboat if you want - for boarding ops), one tender, two submarines (one 206A and one 212A), one FAC and five "local" auxiliary units (high-sea tugs, small tankers and such - probably "bait" in the exercise).

In Seabase terms that means the deployed German Seabase will at least have a command ship with AAW capability, a full-spectrum ASW capability (as there's also a P-3C deployed), two RAS- and VERTREP-capable supply ships, large recon assets, and boarding/interdiction assets with minehunting capability.

The second large contribution will be by Sweden - two corvettes/FACs, a submarine, no less than six minehunters, and three auxiliaries (including a minelayer).

Of course however, the German and Swedish Navy won't be alone. Denmark commits Esbern Snare, the second ship of their new Absalon multi-purpose class. Denmark, Finland and Latvia will also each send two FACs/patrol boats as well. The UK and Poland will each send in a frigate (a Type 23 and a OHP).

The airborne component of this exercise will be provided with two MPAs, four fighter jets and eight helicopters. Additionally, both Sweden's and Germany's contributions include special forces, in particular mine divers, and Germany uses some MSK naval infantry as well, presumably as MPE units. France provides some staff personnel for exercise planning.

Looks like the new NATO CoE is getting some good introduction here. And, with "about 40 ships" involved officially (Hm? Did i miss five?), this is probably one of the biggest exercises worldwide for 2007. It will be interesting to see results of this exercise.

And btw, the German Navy really should work on their press releases a bit. While the English-language article reads rather dry and technical, it has a lot more info on the procedures that will be trained in this exercise. The German version is sort of short and informative - but it lists all participating units down to the number of UH-1D helos deployed.

Gunboat Diplomacy and Asymmetric Threats

2007-10-10T09:29:00.000-07:00

So what does "Basis See" actually mean for deployments for the German Navy, as, with its means, it certainly wouldn't be any equivalent to parking a CBG or ESG offshore to enforce political goals?

"Basis See" (the Seabase) is of course modeled on current deployments (OEF, OAE, UNIFIL), and the direction these could take in the future. Past deployments, such as to Cambodia or Somalia, or missions in Albania and DR Congo also play into how it it composed. The core strength of the Seabase is that it is scalable, and easily adaptable.

A Seabase could be stationed to perform disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in South-East Asia - and would then be composed of say a EGV or JSS along with a frigate like the F125 providing additional airlift or SAR functions while also providing security. This is modeled on actual deployment after the tsunami in Indonesia btw, where Berlin was quickly detached from TF150 and sailed across the Indian Ocean with Allied escorts.

A Seabase could also easily be composed to provide a - littoral - embargo and interdiction system - in that case, a F125 could be joined by several smaller "gunboat" units such as the converted minehunters and FACs and a tender for supply, with ground forces and land-based air assets also networked into the Seabase. Submarines and/or ELINT ships would provide surveillance for the entire taskforce.

In a quick, potentially dirty, peacekeeping deployment such as the one in 2006 to DR Congo - to provide security during elections there - Seabase components offshore would provide not only supply and maritime overwatch roles (as the Navy did in that deployment), but could also provide a "safer" location for command and communications, as well as a central network node for intelligence and reconnaissance. If the situation goes potentially haywire - like in Somalia - the deployed Seabase could provide the ground forces with fire support, as well as - depending on composition - could evacuate deployed forces in orderly fashion.

For the more naval side, deployments such as Gibraltar Straits within OAE, or the primary function of TF150 - providing escort for transiting ships - can be taken care of within the Seabase framework; like in that past deployment, the deployed Seabase would consist of a central core with a command frigate and supply ships, with FACs or corvettes depending on theater providing actual escort against asymmetric threats - be they pirates, local insurgents or terrorists - and land-based assets within secured areas providing additional general support (logistics, fire support...) as well as airborne overwatch/patrol support. If an underwater threat such as minefields has been identified, the appropriate capability can easily be attached to the system.

So, what's really new about this "Basis See"? After all, it only provides the exact same functions the Navy has filled otherwise in the past years.

Well, mostly "Basis See" is about enhanced integration. The Navy is now defining a framework from which capabilities are selected and deployed according to the needs of deployments. What happens if that isn't applied was somewhat visible in the TF150 deployment within OEF: German Forces in that theater were vastly oversized, and some components - such as the FACs - weren't suited to the environment even. The result is that Germany has withdrawn almost its entire forces from that deployment - one frigate remains there - while Allies are clamoring for more contribution.

For comparison, the initial German contribution to TF150 consisted of twelve ships, about ten aircraft, a logistics unit, and a company-sized naval infantry deployment; a MCM squadron with six ships was additionally earmarked in case of demand.

"Basis See" is also about enhancing cooperation with other parts of the military; especially in the reconnaissance, fire support, logistics and deployment C4I areas, on which they are focussing, this could lead to far more "compact" - and cost-effective - deployments managing equal results in the field.

And then there's the real expeditionary part - within the "Basis See" framework, the Navy is supposed to gain the capability to flank diplomatic efforts. This actually is Gunboat Diplomacy - the Seabase flanking a diplomatic effort is supposed to provide escalation and deescalation as needed to obtain political goals. However, the Navy restricts itself to a capability there that's actually obtainable both politically and through tight funding - that is the capability to escalate by lobbing a few missiles at high-priority targets by offshore assets. There's no one - well, no one outside the Internet - crying for German carriers, or German amphibious assault assets. Because, in the real world, that's not a capability the German Navy needs, even for its expeditionary efforts.

I also find it somewhat remarkable that the German Navy - for the most part at least - has managed to complete blend out looking at particular systems while designing the "Basis See" concept. The concept stays completely abstract and theoretical - what is needed is not this or that upgrade to a certain ship class, but what's needed for "Basis See" is a certain capability. Which has to be "as good as possible". Sure, there is threat analysis and possible counters to threats involved. But, within the abstract level, this becomes "Do we have the capability to counter X efficiently? Within which system, which has which other capabilities?". It's an effort to divide between looking for certain capabilities, and looking for particular systems to fill those capabilities - and a commendable one. After all, you should first look at what you actually want to do, before spending heaps of money on systems you might never need within your strategic positioning.

The German Navy - Setting the Course for the next 20 Years

2007-10-09T18:04:00.000-07:00

The German Navy, in the last 15 years, hasn't changed much from the Cold War NATO-contribution Navy it was. A few units have been newly built, a few capabilities reduced, but overall, so far it's only been a renewal of existing capability. Take the direct replacement of three Type 103B AAW destroyers with three new Type 124 heavy AAW frigates, a good example of that. But now, since last year, the Navy has actually started redefining itself.

For the German Military, which has been in a transformation process officially since 2003, last year was a rather crucial point in publicity, as the Ministry of Defense released its new Weißbuch. The Weißbuch - quite literally "whitepaper" - defines the threats, missions and challenges the German Military faces in the present and future, and gives a broad view of how the Military should face these.

This whitepaper actually has rather big implications for change for the Navy. The Navy is supposed to turn "expeditionary". Based upon the missions the navy currently faces, their new mission has been defined as "transforming the sea into an operation base for joint-service operations". The Navy, based upon this new task set, has worked since last year to develop an approach on how to handle this. The core concept for this new approach is called "Basis See" (Seabase).

"Basis See" is composed of several subtasks that might seem somewhat familiar:

- Enforcing maritime embargoes and other interdiction missions
- Protecting German maritime trade routes, including overseas
- Transporting, prepositioning, supplying and evacuating ground forces in theaters
- Supporting such ground forces with fire support, in particular standoff strikes
- Supporting such ground forces in communications, command and reconnaissance

Of course, "Basis See" won't be the sole capability of the Navy; the MoD and Navy high-ups also stress that the Navy will still need to be able to deal with underwater threats - both submarines and mines - as well as deal with conventional warfare within a regional conflict. And all that is supposed to work both within Germany's international security framework - i.e. NATO, EU etc - as well as independantly.

While the other parts - conventional warfare and surface/underwater asymmetric/terrorist threats - are well dealt with within the German Navy within existing capabilities, the "Basis See" part isn't all that clear yet. So far, mostly interim solutions have been used on existing missions, but for the medium to long term, the Navy is working on building actual plans to deal with these missions. By the end of the year, a self-analysis of the German Navy will be finished - which will outline which capabilities needed for "Basis See" are existant in the current Navy, and which will have to be newly acquired.

So how will the Navy approach this? With funding tight, and political support for new defence acquisitions always a bit shaky, the only realistic possibility is to reuse and redefine as much existing equipment as possible, and fill the holes with new procurement.

The easiest thing for the Navy is the stuff outside "Basis See". Germany has a rather large, very modern MCM fleet from Cold War times, as that was one of its primary functions within NATO. This MCM fleet will almost entirely remain, with only a few older minehunters relegated to patrol duties with a refit to serve as "guard ships" for boarding operations - the first such refitted ship for "guard duties", Bad Rappenau, has just taken part in its first FLOTEX with a 14-man Mobile Protection Element aboard on October 3rd, German Reunification Day (for those wondering: the refit apparently only includes replacing the Penguin B3 drones with RIBs, and adding a 40mm grenade MG and some GPMGs to the regular 27mm gun, plus a OP room for the MPE probably).

In addition to those four 660-ton "gunboats" backing up the current FAC fleets in patrol/interdiction operations, some additional buys have been considered lately; the Navy has experimented with using Finnish Jurmo LCVPs - which can be armed almost to similar levels as the Swedish CB90, but are considerably lighter - from its EGV replenishment ships.

The ASW solution is similar - while there will be somewhat significant reductions (F122 gone in the future, submarines halved in numbers), the future German ASW solution will still consist of a full-spectrum networked system with six extremely modern submarines, at least four updated ASW frigates and eight maritime patrol aircraft. One little downside is that the MPAs are used P-3C which are realistically only an interim solution for the next 10-15 years, and will need replacement then. And that the ASW upgrade for the F123 frigates isn't decided yet, and only Bayern has the LFASS towed array sonar fitted so far. However, all four frigates will receive incremental upgrades over the next 3-4 years, and this will hopefully include LFASS too.
For overall conventional naval warfare, these two fleets will be joined by three modern AAW frigates, as well as considerable additional multi-function assets with ASuW focus and up-to-date self-defence systems, and land-based fighter/strike-bomber cover. A compact navy with very modern assets and considerable firepower.

The approach to "Basis See" is a mixed one. The latest signed contract for the F125 frigates, which are focussed on land attack and maritime interdiction scenarios, show part of the direction this is going. However, the F125 for quite some time will remain the only units that are as focussed on "Basis See". Other tasks within "Basis See" can be solved by existing units, with some upgrades. The main problem is in interfacing navy systems and doctrines with those of the Army and Airforce. To this end, the Navy has performed a couple maneuvers - for command functions with the Army, for AAW coordination with the Airforce - in the last two years, which have highlighted some problems on the Navy side especially regarding command systems and logistics. Most of these can however be solved by "soft" upgrades - integrating and interfacing command systems, upgrading policies and changing doctrines in some regards. We'll see some experiments in this regard over the next few years, probably.

Regarding organization - and concept planning - the Navy has already implemented an effective scheme there as part of the overall Bundeswehr transformation. Within this new organizational scheme, two flotillas have been formed: The "littoral" 1st Flotilla, containing all smaller units up to the corvettes, and the "open-ocean" 2nd Flotilla, containing the frigates as well as the auxiliary units. The Navy has placed connection points to other services - medical and logistics - at the appropriate points, and has centralized training under a single agency operating all Navy schools (except for submarine-specific training). Also, the Navy has deepened its involvement in NATO cooperative concept development, with the NATO Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters recently placed in Kiel as part of the 1st ("Littoral") Flotilla Command. This Center will contribute by developing and testing policies and technologies for littoral warfare, which the Navy will be able to directly apply within ongoing deployments.

Other parts in "Basis See" are already established, even though some adaptions have to be implemented. Within the next 12 months, the Navy will commission five new K130 corvettes, in reality light ASuW frigates, which will considerably lower the workload of existing units, especially in regard to escort and ocean patrol roles. Reconnaissance is addressed by two existing Navy assets - submarines and the Type 423 ELINT/SIGINT ships, whose "coincidental" presence around UNIFIL has been giving Israel some headaches. Additionally, for future conflicts, recon/surveillance support will also be lend by the Luftwaffe's yet-to-be-introduced EuroHawk surveillance UAVs as well as the recon satellite network that's currently being launched - five German radar sats networked with two French IR sats will provide both nations with quite some capability there. The naval role in recon, according to the Navy, will be to provide an asset that can operate even when legal or tactical reasons exclude other means.

Some of the above tasks however will need "creative thinking". For joint command roles that include deployed ground troops - which can easily go to several thousand even in peace-keeping missions - the existing staff rooms aboard F123 and F124 class frigates simply won't be big enough. Those are big enough to implement the necessary staff for a naval taskforce - for example a F123 is currently commanding the naval component of UNIFIL with over a dozen ships - but with staff for ground forces added, something bigger will be needed. There have been suggestions in Navy Staff to go a similar route to the French Navy in that regard - that is, converting AORs into "Command Supply Ships".
With existing units, this is actually a solution that could be implemented pretty cheaply - the Berlin class EGV are equipped to handle containerized modular systems, with currently a 26-container hospital usually mounted on deployments. We might even see such a system procured for or rather with the third EGV, to be commissioned around 2012, as there isn't really a need to procure a third hospital set.

The land attack task mentioned above is also not that much of a problem as it might seem. The 127mm Vulcano guns as mounted on the F125, while capable for this role, aren't the main component, nor are guns in general. The Navy approach emphasizes immediate, flexible escalation against high-priority targets from the seabase at standoff
ranges, meaning the primary system will be missiles. As the current missile outfit of the Navy - Exocet MM38 and Harpoon Block 1C - is considered outdated, the Navy is currently looking for a new "common" missile, which will be mounted at least on the twelve F122 and F123 frigates, and will also outfit the F125. The prime candidate for this "common land-attack/anti-ship missile" so far is RBS-15 Mk4, which is being developed jointly between Germany and Sweden. Since the RBS-15 Mk3 is already fitted to the five new K130 corvettes, this would be a rather prudent move, as that would allow simply switching components to upgrade those to the same standard.

This is not to mean that the 127mm guns just bought will go unused. However, i'm seeing these more used in other roles than simple land-attack. As the Vulcano system will give these guns considerable range with possibility for a non-overkill strike, i could see it given some good use in covering the boats the F125 will deploy in boarding missions (see HMS Cornwall?), or to cover evacuation missions against point targets, something that proved somewhat tough for German troops in Albania in 1997, for example. Of course, for a good number of these applications, integration with the Army's and Luftwaffe's future Joint Fire Support Teams will have to happen first.

The big thing is of course the "transport" task. One can easily mistake that statement for a need for amphibious forces, and this is why implementation will prove tough - especially politically. However, amphibious insertion isn't what the Navy means here. What's meant is pure sealift, with the capability to transport troops even into low-grade ports overseas, and to keep such troops - or their equipment - at sea in a readiness state until the go-ahead is given at a political level. So, no LPDs for Germany really. The Navy is tentatively working on a concept they've called "Joint Support Ship". No relation to the identically-named Canadian replenishment/sealift ship project though, and i'd be surprised if something close to the Canadian concept would be realized - simply because the needs aren't the same, as Germany has dedicated AORs. A straight cargo/sealift ship, maybe with the same module support as on the Berlin AORs, is more likely for Germany. However, this is a project that's far in the future - the Navy doesn't expect this to come anytime before 2020, simply for funding reasons. Politically, this will be a tough one - and a lot of people doubt this will ever come along - but in my opinion that really depends on how they sell it to parliament.

An initial sealift capability has already been introduced - as far as I know without parliamentary approval due to low costs and due to that also not very public. Don't think I've read a single line in German newspapers about it. This initial capability is formed by a joint contract with Denmark signed in December 2006 which will provide both nations with three commercial RoRo ships "on demand". Joining with Denmark here is a good move here as both nations have identical requirements - both operate similar or identical Army equipment - and already cooperate on the Army level with the Multi-National Corps East (along with Poland) within NATO.

"After 2020" is also the date given for another procurement: The Navy is finally looking for an alternative replacement for the ten Type 143A FACs. The originally planned replacement by another batch of K130 corvettes hasn't been possible for cost reasons, and building another batch when funding becomes available would mean procuring a then already old design. So, the Navy will kick off the K131 project with the 2009 funding plan. Of course, since this is a
rather long-term acquisition, the Navy doesn't have any details yet - and doesn't even know what to use these for. I'd say the K131, if realized, will probably be used to stuff holes found in the "Basis See" concept by then. Around the time this would be up for decision, the Navy will have a clearer idea - and some experience - in what it lacks, and can use these new corvettes to address them. The only details - rather tentative - that have been in the rumour
mill by now is that the K131 class will involve six ships, and that they're likely to be smaller (and therefore cheaper?) than the - for a "corvette" - rather oversized K130.

Overall, while the Navy will face some cuts in certain areas - the submarine going down from 12 to 6 subs for example - replacements in almost all those areas are more capable. And better suited to the new "vision" of the Navy. And all this without really "big" investment, as all that has already been done and approved. Due to the submarine cuts, as well as the long-term replacement of FACs with a lower number corvettes, fleet numbers will lower somewhat. Currently the Navy employs 73 "floating weapon systems", with the new corvettes this will rise to 78 by the end of next year. In the long term, due to above cuts, this will be lowered somewhat - say to around 70 maybe - but the German Navy isn't really facing the same huge cuts in numbers that other European Navies are potentially facing over the next 10-20 years.

That brings us to the industry situation. In the short term, there isn't much military work to do in the yards. The K130 have been delivered, and the only ongoing military project is the second batch of Type 212A submarines being built at HDW. This won't change for at least 2-3 years, at which point building for the new F125 frigates and the third EGV will start. However, on the overall situation, the German shipyard industry is doing quite well - because it's not as dependant on the military as sometimes said. Order books on the commercial side are pretty full - about a dozen mid-sized container ships and a dozen mega-yachts are currently under construction in German yards. Additionally, the German Coastguard - an umbrella organization for several different government agencies actually - is currently having four new large ships built in those yards, which will significantly enhance the Coastguards standing in the North Sea.

The German shipbuilding and other naval industry nevertheless will continually try to enhance and apply its military know-how, in particular through exports. New systems are continually developed for this purpose to fit customer markets, like the U210mod submarine design shown by TKMS at SubCon 2007 last month. The government attempts to curb some exploits that have popped up over the last few years - in particular in regard to major foreign shares in German defence industries. This happened in light of unapproved technology transfers (in submarines, in particular) as well as some corruption issues with weapons deals in the 90s. In the reverse direction, that is import of equipment and technology, a similar protectionism is applied though: Production of systems almost exclusively happens locally - missiles generally at Diehl BGT Defence for example - and for to-be-procured systems, German companies are almost always part of joint research. Notable exclusions in the naval field in recent years have been light torpedoes acquired from EuroTorp, naval guns from Finmeccanica, or electronics acquired from Thales - but in general, German procurement attempts to "buy local" and, if that's not possible, at least "build local". While this kind of protectionism might gall some free-market people, I'd say it's a needed tool to keep up a viable defence industry in all fields.

As a whole, the Navy seems to be doing pretty well lately, though. Although it has been bumbling around a bit in the past years without clear concepts (the K130 didn't make much sense in 1998, but fits the picture pretty well today, for example), it seems to have regained some of its wind. While some of the concepts the Navy will be operating under are considered somewhat controversial, the Navy has actually so far managed to put together the puzzle of transformation to an "expeditionary" form to a coherent image that makes sense within the framework and situations it's operating in.