First Launch

Yes, this has already popped up on a number of forums; i'm summarizing and extending a bit here.

Last week, IDAS was test-fired for the first time from a submarine.

The German submarine U33 launched the missile while submerged from a torpedo tube, which then unfolded its wings, started the rocket motor and surfaced to go into a controlled flight. After 1500 meters flight the missile picked up the signature of a target drone flying nearby, and on confirmation by the controlling WSO successfully intercepted and destroyed it.

IDAS is the first system worldwide that can maintain fibre-optic guidance while breaking through the surface. Introduction of the missile is planned for around 2014.

Unlike a number of other experimental systems, the missile does not employ a real autonomous seeker of its own; instead, it is "interactive". This means it has an IR sensor, whose image is piped through the fibre-optic cable to the controlling submarine. The submarine's staff and computers evaluate the picture received, and can control the missile based on this.

Also unlike other sub-launched missile systems, IDAS does not employ a container underwater. The missile is directly soft-launched from a torpedo tube (quad-packed in a 21-inch tube), activating its own rocket motor while still underwater. This - in theory - even gives it something of a "stealthing" capability, as the missile would not necessarily have to surface near the submarine. With a mission range stated somewhere around 12 nm (due to the small size of the missile) for standard missions, there are limits to that of course.

IDAS is intended to provide submerged submarines with a short-range fibre-optic guided all-aspect missile for surface, air and land targets. Through the above sensor/cable instead of an autonomous seeker, the missile could also to a limited extent be used as a recon drone surveying the theater before destroying a target found, allowing targets of opportunity, in-flight target reprioritization or mission termination.

The US Navy has called the IDAS development - and in particular potential future proliferation - "dangerous", as it gives submerged submarines an active counter to airborne ASW assets.

Germany already had a similar system planned back in the 90s - Triton, derived from the Polyphem fibre-optic missile. Both Polyphem and Triton died about 5 years ago, with Triton never making it off the drawing boards. That IDAS is now actually being tested like this spells some better fortune for this time around.

Basis See Conference, Pt5 : Industry Implementations

Speeches by:
Kai Horten : ATLAS ELEKTRONIK
Dirk Malgowski : Surface Ship Division, TKMS
Hermann J. Janssen : NAVTEC CONSULT

A number of more or less - rather less - solid proposals from the industry, to finalize this short series of posts.

"Meko Multirole Auxiliary"

TKMS offers this concept "for open discussion in MoD", not as "JSS proposal". Arguably, multi-role/mixed-capability ships with dual amphibious/logistics roles have been gaining market share lately. Examples given are the LPD for Portugal, LHD for South Africa or Canada's JSS.
Externally, the proposal looks remarkably close to the LHD offered by TKMS in the South African tender, i.e. the MHD150.

The Meko Multirole Auxiliary takes Nolting's suggestion of modularization, by offering a triple-role ship with multi-mission modules - TKMS suggests a role change would be possible "within 48 hours", and the modules would use "already introduced standard systems". The three roles to be assumed by this ship would be RAS, LHD and sealift.

• - RAS role: 6,440t fuel, 600t cargo including ammunition, 3 helos
• - LHD role: 750 troops, 650 lm, 870t cargo, 440t fuel, 14 helos
• - Sealift role: 2,500 lm, 500t fuel, 2,500t dry cargo

Such a role change looks rather hefty - though, especially regarding this mix, there's already a decade of experience in the Bundeswehr with the A310 MRTT, which also uses a palletized module system to switch from transport to tanker. A ship of this size would be a far larger application of this of course.


"Trans Sea Lifter"

Another, entirely different concept is proposed by consulting company NAVTEC CONSULT. It proposes a very large system for the Basis See application sealift/transport in a modular framework.

Trans Sea Lifter would be a large SWATH ship. Multiple modules would be carried forward of superstructure. The dimensions are implied with a beam of around 50-60 meters, length in the example with three modules seems to be around 150-180 meters.

The loaded modules would essentially be FloFlo swimming sub-units. Module examples given would be e.g. lighter transport, dry cargo, command, armament.

A number of examples for application are given:

• - transport modules, which themselves can be submerged for FloFlo (for transport and landing operations with lighters and LCUs/LCACs)
• - multiple low-draft swimming base/support modules that can be brought into disaster areas and operate there independantly
• - mothership/tender role in CSW operations to transport and supply small littoral combat surface units or submarines
• - command/medical/logistics role in supporting land forces by using specialized modules for these applications
  
• - modular system for air/surface theater warfare, including protective armament for entire Basis See task force

Especially the last one seems rather far-fetched. According to Janssen, it's only in the conception phase yet, primarily for commercial applications.

Lead from Sea

A number of "Lead from Sea" experiments with command-facility frigates have been going on for the past two years, and are being continued. The positive aspect of this is obvious: It's a cheap, simple solution.
These experiments are primarily intended for small footprint operations; an example situation from last year was leading land units from a F123 frigate to evacuate 50 civilians from a coastal nation.

Horten sees current potential as "Lead from Sea" platforms in those Bundeswehr ships that already have command facilities - the F123 and F124 frigates, the EGV AORs, and the A404 tenders (which house the staff of their squadrons).

In the near future, in particular F125 shows good promise of furthering the approach, as the new CMS being developed by ATLAS for it will be capable of integrating full air/surface awareness for such command facilities; as a first, there'll also be the possibility of integrating AWACS and DCRC into the overall picture through Link 16 interfaces.

ATLAS proposes a containerized proving concept, to be mounted aboard an EGV. The EGV currently possesses basic C2 facilities and Link 11 datalinks; the containerized system would add a Link 16 datalink, upgrade the Link 11, add a air/surface surveillance radar, and add a standard Army C2 system (as has been done in the frigate experiments).

ATLAS sees a number of potential synergy effects for future "Lead from Sea" systems by integrating current more or less experimental software offered by them; such as the ADLER interface that will be used on F125 to tie the 127mm gun into the Army Artillery C3 systems, the MiLiPos protocol integration system that allows exchanging data between different-protocol (Navy, Army, Airforce) command systems via Link 16, or the LexxWar asymmetric combat system that was used in trials last year.

Basis See Conference, Pt4 : Sealift Concepts

Speaches by:
Rüdiger Kloevekorn : Steria Mummert Consulting
Christian Eckel : Surface Ship Division, TKMS

Two speaches that deal with the sealift options available to Germany. Kloevekorn mostly talks about GGSS, Eckel presents some options on GMSV.

As a short introduction: The current system for GGSS used by the Bundeswehr is the ARK contract jointly with Denmark. Under ARK, four RoRo ships are under pre-charter contracts and available as needed to the two nations with a pre-fixed cost limit. However, the ARK contract will end in 2011.

The Bundeswehr has hence looked into 2012+ options for sealift, and Steria Mummert Consulting, along with two other companies, has drafted a study for this at the request of the Bundeswehr.

Some results from this study are presented by Kloevekorn at this conference.

The study takes as its basis a "reasonable" maximum usage of sea transport; for Germany, that means concurrent transport for three different operations in a 30-day timeframe. The three scenarios looked into were apparently a NATO NRF operation, a Military Evacuation Operation, and the rotation of a peace-keeping contingent. The equipment requirements for these operations were given by the Bundeswehr.

Based upon this, an operational need was worked out, with a variation due to the possibility of using different European ports in different distances to the mission theaters - in particular with NRF a definitive option. Effectively, the Bundeswehr needs between 8000 and 13500 lanemeters RoRo sealift (3-5 ships with 2500-3000 lanemeters), plus 1200 TEU for the NRF operation and 70 TEU for the rotation.

As part of the study, a number of options are explored. The container transport would be a case for commercial transport - regular transport lines for the (long pre-planned) rotation operation, and a chartered container transport for the NRF operation.

For the sealift, not surprisingly, a continuation of ARK is suggested. It is concluded that an ARK transport - calling in all pre-contracted ships for 30 days - has similar costs to a commercial charter option. However, ARK adds the security of having the ships available as needed, and provides an upper cost limit. It's suggested that potentially a third German ship should be added to ARK, bringing the total to five ships. Additionally, a pre-charter option for two similar-sized RoRos is suggested to provide an extra 5000 lm, and the formation of a government or Bundeswehr agency that would secure long-term pre-charter contracts (to avoid costly short-term charter) is recommended.

Two alternatives are given. The first would be the option that the Royal Navy took - building (5) ships for the Bundeswehr itself, and then chartering them out through a public-private subcompany to increase cost effectiveness. The second alternative is a purely German version of ARK, implemented together with the German industry (an option if Denmark bows out of ARK, unlikely).

Eckel, a board member of the Surface Ship Division of TKMS, looks into GSMV primarily. GGSS is well-secured through ARK. GMSV is a clear capability lack, and the already noticed option of GMSV providing a shuttle service between a seabourne logistics base and land forces is also mentioned by him.

He sees three potential options for GMSV. The first one is, rather simply, international pooling - i.e. using Allied assets, or joint GMSV operation with Allies. The second option is a domestic design, for which TKMS offers their "innovative system engineering model" of course.

The third option is a bit more interesting - piggybacking on foreign projects. Of course TKMS isn't exactly happy about this option. However, he goes to the extent of naming examples that Germany could hop into - i.e. the French Mistral, the rather widespread Schelde Enforcer, and the Canadian JSS.

The selection of these in particular is somewhat interesting - i'd personally suspect the following reasons: Mistral to appease the government's idea of a "French-German motor" in Europe; Schelde Enforcer because those would at least provide construction contracts for the German industry; and the Canadian JSS because TKMS is already involved in that.

Part 5, the final part, will delve into GMSV a bit further, with some proposals.

Basis See Conference, Pt3 : The Other Services

Speaches by:
Brig-Gen. Markus Kneip : Army C4I/CD&E Staff Division Leader; 2006 commander of ISAF Regional Command North
Brig-Gen. Jochen Both : Airforce C4I/CD&E Staff Division Leader
Brig-Gen. Heinrich Geppert : General of Future Development of the Joint Support Service (SKB)
Col.(Med) Bernd Mattiesen : Medical Service CD&E Staff Branch Leader

Now for the other side. The other four branches of the Bundeswehr get to present their view of Basis See too.

Kneip levels some criticism at the concept. The Navy has a level of ambition of leading up to 1000 ground soldiers from a Basis See command center for example; Kneip thinks that's way too much ambition. He also criticizes the basic issue of Supporting and Supported Commander - in his opinion, the Army commander of the ground troops should in almost all situations be the Supported Commander, with the Navy commander taking a back seat.

However, in his opinion, Basis See still offers a flexible instrument for short missions. Realistic missions named by him are in particular evacuation, extraction, and early entry. Basis See, in his opinion, is inefficient when land bases are operated in parallel.

The airforce sees limited application for the "Lead from Sea" concept of Basis See. There's particular potential for strategic Reach Back for Airforce assets, i.e. relaying tactical information between in-theater airborne assets and strategic C4ISTAR assets. Other applications are seen for example in limited theater C2 e.g. in Evacuation Operations, however a more widely applied maritime C2 infrastructure is seen as not necessary for the airforce, which would use land bases anyway.

Geppert doesn't show any criticism at all; he sees a demand for integration of the Joint Support Service's assets though, i.e. for "Lead from Sea" in particular interfaces to Military Intelligence and the Strategic Reconnaissance Command.

GMSV, the amphibious component, is similarly disputed. The Airforce of course thinks that such a component is not needed in an allied framework, since the Airforce would be the primary supplier of strategic and tactical transport. Geppert, however, sees GMSV as "reasonable", as long as the cost/effect factors are evaluated beforehand.

GGSS, the sealift component, is not in question. Both airforce and SKB think it's necessary and important, especially for logistics.

Mattiesen expands a bit on the medical side of Basis See. For him, the medical chain is important, and navy components of this chain - such as a sea-based hospital - need to have relay capability to land-based and home-based assets worked out. For the Medical Branch, their navy components - such as the MERZ containerized hospital onboard the EGVs - are primarily useful in early entry and similar missions. The primary component for the Medical Branch for longer missions however is StratAirMedEvac by their excellently-equipped A310 MedEvacs.

There is only a limited possibility for the airforce to base its assets on navy platforms. Examples named by Both there are primarily CSAR in Special Operation, but of course also specialized MedEvac helicopters.

The Joint Support Service sees the Basis See concept as "supportable" with their own forces - these would be e.g. logistics, military police, military intelligence etc. The Joint Support Service according to Geppert has apparently already started an internal evaluation of how to fit force packages to Basis See in comparison to the current land-based approach.

Part 4 will present a sealift study done for the Bundeswehr.

Basis See Conference, Pt2 : The Navy

Speaches by:
Vice-Adm. Wolfgang E. Nolting : Inspector of the Navy
Flot.-Adm. Klaus von Dambrowski : Navy C4I/CD&E Staff Division Leader
Flot.-Adm. Karl-Wilhelm Ohlms : Navy Logistics Staff Division Leader

Three speaches that i've grouped together for summarization. These present the Navy point of view, primarily from the Navy planning section at the MoD.

Basis See, from the Navy point of view, has a wide mission spectrum, in particular in joint operations. Of particular value, given previous missions, is the capability for expeditionary operations without Host Nation Support. Dambrowski outlines a number of missions undertaken in the past 10 years - from evacuating troops from Somalia on frigates to disaster support in Bandah Aceh by a EGV - to underline this.

Ohlms gives a description of Basis See that i rather like - according to him, it represents an "Order of Capabilities", which forms an abstract layer between the initial mission concept and the Order of Battle. The Order of Capabilities is derived from the mission context - selecting capabilities out of what the Basis See framework offers to fit the mission - and the order of battle is subsequently derived from the Order of Capabilities - ie selecting ships that offer the selected capabilities.

There are still a number of legal problems for the German Navy when facing non-military threads such as piracy or terrorism. Both for operations inside the German EEZ - German Military may not be used internally - and in certain scenarios abroad. For example, a German ship without a parliamentary mandate can't attack a pirate ship with military means according to Nolting, who proposes a change of constitution to solve this issue - a little change to Article 87, which demands parliamentary approval for peacetime use of the military.

Nolting also notes that Basis See has one distinct plus for German foreign politics - a naval expedition reduces the dangers of being drawn into foreign conflicts in comparison to traditional ground-based peace-keeping.

Dambrowski outlines the immediate further development of Basis See: In particular, the CD&E for the "Lead from the Sea" project will be continued. Also, the recently founded NATO Center of Excellence for Operations in Confined Shallow Waters, located at Kiel, will be used as a think tank of sorts that will bring further development into Basis See.

There is a dilemma coming up in the future according to Nolting. That being keeping traditional conventional warfare capabilities despite the transformation. This is of course something that has been given thought worldwide lately - does specialization for expeditionary warfare - and in particular asymmetric warfare - cripple the navies in a potential conventional conflict. Nolting sees modularization as a possible solution, while traditional specialized units may face obsolescence.

Ohlms also sees an elementary question of mission modularity or multi-mission-capability in future platforms. He brings in the doubtful side though, citing necessary evaluation of cost, logistics and training for such mission modularity, especially when considering potentially necessary in-theater role changes. There are a number of capabilities though that can be exploited without too much of that, namely the increased usage of UUVs, UAVs and USVs from Navy platforms for a number of capabilities. For future units, there's a potential for modularization in both the K131 corvette class and the Joint Support Ship project, according to Ohlms.

Regarding expeditionary warfare, one thing is of course lacking in the German Navy, and that's an amphibious component. This amphibious component is discussed as GMSV in the Navy - Gesicherter Militärische See-Verlegefähigkeit, i.e. Secured Military Sea-Transport Capability. Dambrowski sees GMSV as a necessary component. GMSV is complemented by GGSS - commercial sealift. Both differ of course in that GGSS only offers basic transport, while GMSV has the potential to host force packages. One additional potential use for GMSV is seen in shuttling cargo between GGSS and a mission area by Dambrowski. Nolting however strictly denies that the Navy is seeking a Marine Force service, which would of course be a somewhat logical proceeding from GMSV.

Finally, there's a short introduction into the Industry/Navy relationship presented in these speaches. Apparently, this relationship currently faces some quality and competency issues due to cost-saving pressure and the public market. A possible solution for this is proposed through a sort of public-private partnership, based on the currently developing "structured dialogue" between Navy and industry. Such a public-private partnership could also be applied in other fields, in particular cross-training (to retain competency of specialized personnel) and infrastructure.

Part 3 will be the views of the other services to contrast this.

Basis See Conference, Pt1 : Politics

Speaches by:
Thomas Kossendey : Deputy Secretary of Defense
Dagmar G. Wöhrl : Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Technology and "Maritime Coordinator" of the German Government

Two civilians from the German government spoke at the conference, both the deputy secretaries of their respective ministries. The below summarizes their speaches somewhat.

For the German Political Scene, Basis See is part of the ongoing transformation process to readjust the Bundeswehr to modern conflict types, including enabling the 3-Block-War concept at sea. Primarily, Basis See offers an instrument for the government to flank political and diplomatic actions through expeditionary capabilities.

Additionally, Basis See according to Kossendey can also be a viable instrument to support regional security efforts, such as the "African Ownership" concept, without leaving too much of a footprint, and without exerting too much of a visible external influence.

As part of the transformation, the Navy transitions from an Escort Navy to a modern Expeditionary Navy. This requires in particular new capabilities regarding joint operations. All modernisation of Navy equipment will be oriented towards this new capability profile. Certain elements of this, such as the third EGV, are viewed as definitely necessary among the goverment.

Wöhrl also mentions the second focal point of the new German Navy: That Germany is dependant on sea trade, and the Navy has the duty to secure sea tradelines. This is an issue that is primarily a government position, not one that came from the Navy itself.

The German maritime industry, according to Wöhrl, needs to continue consolidating itself nationally. The next step after that would be consolidation on a European basis, something that of course already started with TKMS' buying spree.

Especially for more synergy effects - and hence less costs - the government desires an increased pan-European cooperation in naval construction. However, there are of course structural and political limitations to this, and certain European Allies are "not ready yet" for such cooperation according to Wöhrl.

The Ministry of Commerce sets a target line for the German industry: Holding and if possible enlarging the German world market share. Officially, Germany holds 70% market share in submarines, and 25% export share in frigates (wonder where they got those numbers though). Also, German maritime industry will need to increase their export quota anyway, since domestic demand will be reduced in the future. Current export share of production is 70%.

Part 2 will present the Navy view of Basis See.

Not Dead Yet

Just as a little inbetween update:

I'm currently working on a (lengthy) presentation of the October 2007 conference on "Basis See" hosted by Griephan Global Security and the Deutsche Marine Institut think tank.
Documentation for that conference, for a sneak preview, can be found here (in German only).

The Bundeswehrplan 2009 should be leaked sometime in the next three weeks. I'll likely put forward some stuff regarding that too, if there's anything "interesting" in there.
The official budget was hammered out last month already. In 2009, the Bundeswehr will have 30.1 billion Euro available; as a positive thing, funding for the new aircraft of the Flugbereitschaft (couple A319 and A340, as well as Bombardier 5000, total about 1.4 billion euro) will not be drawn from the Bundeswehr budget.

50-year aniversary of joint German-British navy training in Plymouth sometime around now. F219 Sachsen is part of the Weekly War there this week.

The first German K130 corvette Braunschweig was commissioned last month. Currently participating in the Mare Aperto maneuvers off Sicily with her squadron tender Donau.

Eight German ships (three minehunters, two frigates, one FAC, two auxiliaries) just returned from taking part in NATO maneuver JOINT WARRIOR off Scotland training asymmetric and mine warfare scenarios. Part of the scenario is protecting an oil platform against attacking insurgents in small aircraft, dinghis, speedboats and even jetskis.
Other scenarios included attack from land, some ASW, and more specific air threats.

NH90 NFH (MH-90) is getting some criticism for delays lately. MoD is supposedly looking for alternatives.
Somewhat interesting in that regard, JOINT WARRIOR apparently saw a British Merlin operating from a German frigate (more than just crossdecking, the relevant article says "air operations").

Other than that, not really much news regarding the German Navy out there.

HiTaTa 2008

Last week saw the 48th annual "Historic-Tactical Conference" of the German Navy, and this event always brings forth a wealth of information about the German Navy to the public.

I haven't gone through everything yet, but i'll do some random highlights from the three speeches i've read:

1. OAE saw a German P-3C operating with it "for several weeks" (and 26 operational flights); it has now officially reached IOC.
2. UNIFIL Command will be transferred from Germany to the Italian-led EUROMARFOR on March 1st. Germany will reduce its contribution (details not known yet), and FGS Hessen (a Type 124) is planned for the first rotation.
3. OEF will see another German frigate for the next rotation, after that the "target" is to replace it with a P-3C as a "equivalent replacement" (as i expected).
4. FOC for the Type 124 AAW FFGs is "likely pushed back to first half of 2010" due to the software problems; nevertheless, two of the three frigates will be "operational" this year, with the third being retained for software testing.
5. EAV cruise 2008 also includes multiple PASSEX with the USN and Finnish Navy (in addition to the already known ones with India and France).
6. Random tidbit: Good Hope III will involve 14 Kormoran II missiles fired at the EAV ships; additionally, for the first time in years, naval helicopters will live-fire Sea Skua in this exercise.
7. Northern Coasts 2007 was received very well with all contributing nations, and all have signed back up for the 2008 version; the exercise will also replace large-scale national maneuvers for the Swedish and Finnish Navies.
8. Apparently, there are some 30 "points of contestion" about the K130 still, which is why they haven't been commissioned yet. However, they are "hopeful that the first will be commissioned during this quarter".
9. The DM2A4 torpedo has been officially cleared for the Navy (after exercises last year), and the first live-fire shooting in commission is planned for IV/2008.
10. German Sea King helicopters are receiving a "tactical support capability" for Special Forces, with the basics tested during Northern Coasts.
11. Vice-Admiral Nolting is mulling buying two new AOs to replace FGS Spessart and FGS Rhön (in addition to any new EGVs).
12. The F125 project is getting a dedicated taskgroup at the ministry that will try to prevent the same kind of problems popping up with F124 and K130 and is supposed to "keep the initiative with the Bundeswehr".
13. The "Military Sealift Requirement" of Basis See was apparently hammered out at "around 800 soldiers and their equipment" as a "realistic size" - in order to support a EU Battlegroup, or for evacuation operations. Note that this is the entire requirement, not for a single ship. And doesn't say anything about the type of ship (LPD/LHD/T-AKE style military RoRo)
    
14. Apparently the new Concept for "Basis See" includes a requirement for TBMD in it somewhere. Urgh.
    
    
    

Command from the Sea

In September 2007, the German Navy tested a project outlined in "Basis See" - using naval assets as offshore command bases for land forces.

This concept testing project was started in 2005 already, and now culminated in a Exercise with a defined scenario that would be an application of "Basis See":
About 50 military advisors stuck in a erupting civil war zone have to be evacuated, and, as there are no available forward land bases for an operation, the Division of Special Operations will have to perform this operation from the Type 123 frigate Bayern.
The necessary Heer planning and command staff for this operation was airlifted to the frigate, and set up camp aboard with support by the Navy, planning out the evacuation operation.

The primary point of this experiment was to prove the viability of a "forward command post" onboard a existing navy unit. The Type 123 frigates offer enough space for an additional 20 men living and working for this task onboard without limiting the ship's own crew. As this is far below the company-sized regular command setup for such operations, the forward command staff heavily depends on communications with further staff at home. This experiment in September primarily tested the viability of setting up this command post, setting up a Army C3 IT System (FüInfoSysH) onboard the ship, and establishing and maintaining communications with command staff at home via HF radio and SHF-Satcom. Planned future experiments in the same direction will extend on maintaining and improving this communications route.

The next test will be in April this year onboard another F123 frigate, Brandenburg. The target is to get a Standard Operations Procedure (SOP) manual ready for actual operations by mid-2008, and introducing "Command from the Sea" as a new capability for the German Navy by then.

More Russian-German Cooperation

In civilian shipping, commercial "classification agencies" run registers of ships sorted into various classes (e.g. by size), and provide technical oversight and surveys of all ships on their register. "Classification" is required to enter any territorial waters in the EU for example, for safety concerns. Also, this is usually required to obtain any insurance for a ship.

In total, there are only 40 such agencies worldwide, with ten of them operating internationally and acknowledging each others registers as "valid"; these ten are organized in the IACS organization.

Now, two of these ten agencies within the IACS are the German "Germanischer Lloyd" (GL) and the state-run Russian "Maritime Register of Shipping" (RS).

Germany and Russia signed several contracts over the last six months.

Part of these is among other things that GL will closely cooperate with the St Petersburg Maritime University, one of the best maritime engineering universities worldwide.

Additionally, and that's the big thing, GL and RS will be mutually able to operate in each other's country. That means that Germans and Russians will - to some extent - supervise each other's shipbuilding industry, maritime safety, and technical upkeep in the civilian maritime sector in the future.

A big step.

German Deployments Update

I did a post back in October on current German deployments.

Guess it's time for a little update there, especially quite a number of ships have rotated since then.

MTF448 (UNIFIL)

FGS Bayern (F217) - since Oct 07, CTG

FGS Werra (A514) - since Jan 08, FAC Castle at Limassol
FGS Puma (P1622) - rotated in Nov 07
FGS Zobel (P1625) - rotated in Nov 07

FGS Auerbach/Oberpfalz (M1093) - rotated in Sep 07
FGS Überherrn (M1095) - rotated in Sep 07

Didn't list the two MCM vessels in the last post since i was somewhat in doubt as to their actual deployment; they are not covered by the current doctrine (1 FFG + 2 FAC), and are likely to return this or next month at the latest anyway.

The two FACs might be in for a one-year tour with a "wet" crew switch again - though we won't know that before May or so.

CTF150 (Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa)

FGS Augsburg (F213) - since Sep 07, until about Feb 08

Operation Active Endeavour

FGS Alster (A50) - has been spotted in Malta a few days ago

Both submarines previously assigned returned in December. In my opinion though we're likely to see another Type 212A assigned sometime later this year again. The presence of Alster, like with her sisters, is hushed down as usual - but we can expect one of the three surveillance ships in the area at all times pretty much, also to support MTF448.

SNMG2 in the Mediterranean will apparently have multiple 3-week detachments supporting OAE as well during the next 6 months; Niedersachsen (below) is earmarked for two such detachments already.

Standing NATO fleets:

SNMG1 - FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F209), since Nov 07
SNMG2 - FGS Niedersachsen (F208), since Jan 08

SNMCMG1 - FGS Weilheim (M1059), since Jan 08
SNMCMG2 - contribution inactive, since Jul 07

Training Cruises

FGS Hamburg (F220)
FGS Köln (F211)
FGS Berlin (A1411)
FGS Westerwald (A1435)

See this post for details on the primary EAV cruise this year.

Several other ships currently "inactive" (below) will presumably host further EAV activities over the next 6 months - in particular Hessen and Karlsruhe are likely there.

Recently returned from deployments

FGS Lübeck (F214) - from MTF448, late Nov 07
FGS Emden (F210) - from FOST at Plymouth, mid Dec 07

Scheduled for Marinearsenal

FGS Bremen (F207) - for overhaul starting around Feb 08

Recently returned from Marinearsenal

FGS Hessen (F221) - around mid Jan 08
FGS Karlsruhe (F212) - around mid Dec 07


Now, while putting the above list together, i tried to track down the other frigates. Without much success so far - i know two have been around Wilhelmshaven during the last few months, while with the other two i'm at a loss. Not that there are many left really - only four out of 15 frigates are missing, and that should say something about the workload of German ships.

Update:

FGS Brandenburg (F215) - scheduled trials in April, so she's around home
FGS Schleswig-Holstein (F216) - scheduled yard time

Under contracted-out repair work at Peene-Werft, Wolgast:
FGS Grömitz (M1064)
FGS Frettchen (P6126)
Both damaged in accidents last year.

Contribution

The German Navy is finally contributing a frigate to a Standing NATO fleet again - Niedersachsen is about to join SNMG2 in Turkey.

For over a year, due to the high national use of the frigates, the Marine wasn't able - or willing - to contribute any combat ships to SNMG1 and SNMG2 and instead had the two civilian-crewed AOs Spessart and Rhön support the two fleets.
This changed with Sachsen joining SNMG1 in January 2007, followed by Rheinland-Pfalz in that group. SNMG2 had Rhön assigned to it until late December.

SNMG2's primary task over the next six months will be to support Operation Active Endeavour in patrolling the Eastern and Central Mediterranean.

Short news from the rumour mill...

... have a new date for the commissioning of the K130 Corvette Braunschweig.

April 2008.

Apparently she ran aground while transiting the Kiel Canal, resulting in damage to her propellers.

Braunschweig is currently officially still "on trials" under military authority (or rather, classified a non-navy government vessel) since being handed over by TKMS in 2006 after sea trials. The "prototype" of the K130 class - as she's been referred to by her Captain - was originally supposed to be commissioned in May 2007.

EAV Tour 2008

"EAV" is the German Training Cruise Flotilla, setting out yearly to train new officer cadets. This year - leaving Germany on January 15th - the cruise will go a bit further than usual. The EAV for 2008 consists of the Type 124 frigate FGS Hamburg (F 220), Type 122 frigate FGS Köln (F 211), and the Type 702 AOR FGS Berlin (A 1411).

The tour, this year, will first set out for Accra, Ghana to the Gulf of Guinea - where the African Partnership Station Initiative is active - then go on towards South Africa.

Around Namibia, the flotilla will meet up with the ammunition RAS ship FGS Westerwald (A 1435), and will enter the month-long maneuver series "Good Hope III" along with German airforce units and the South-African Navy and Airforce off the coast of South Africa. The German airforce units includes aircraft from Recon Wing 51, the Luftwaffe Tornado wing tasked with Naval Strike missions, and "Good Hope III" will primarily focus on air-defence scenarios and joint operations.

After a visit Port Louis, Mauritius, the flotilla then continues on to Kochi in India, where further joint maneuvers will be held with the Indian Navy to "strengthen the ties between the German and Indian Navies".

The flotilla will then traverse the Fifth Fleet AoR, with a visit to Oman, and transfer to the Mediterranean through Suez. In the Mediterranean, in a sort of tradition for the EAV, a further two weeks of joint maneuvers with the French Marine Nationale are scheduled, before the ships return to Germany with some side visits to Spain, the UK and Ireland.

The whole cruise will take about 6 months.

NoCo 2007 - New Name, Same Thing

The German Luftwaffe's Operational Staff Airforce just completed exercise "Kalkar Sky 2007".

This was a comparable small exercise by numbers of people involved, however a somewhat important one - the task was to install and operate a Combined Joint Forces Air Command HQ (no, you don't want to know the German term for that), command forces enforcing a simulated no-flight-zone, coordinate tactical air transport, SAR, MEDEVAC etc pp. The usual things. Primarily a test of newly acquired C3I IT equipment and "deployable HQ structures", btw.

The interesting part? The scenario.

It involves Amberland and Beachland, a former war leading to a just-beginning peace-keeping & -enforcing EU/NATO mission, a no-flight zone installed over the disputed territories,
a fundamentalist separatist group in the disputed territories operating with terrorist tactics, the whole thing turning into a limited asymmetric war zone...

Right. That's exactly the Northern Coast 2007 OPGEN scenario, with the focus here being on the airforce assets instead of the Navy.

I'd actually love to see this scenario develop. Update it a bit, say every 3 or 4 months, with OPFOR info from Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon (all three of which are in there), as well as other intel, and let it run its course with regular maneuvers over the next couple years. As long as there are good storyboard writers in the background, this could turn out interesting.

Fully Operational?

Since their commissioning, the three Type 124 AAW frigates have been wrought with one little problem - their FCS software is incompatible. This is the result of ordering the ships from three different yards, and splitting FCS installation along with the contract (something that will not be repeated with Type 125). The incompatibility isn't visible at first - each ship funtions perfectly well, as long as it's on its own. However, the three ships are not able to share battlefield information among each other beyond standard Link-11 datalink messaging. Which effectively means that they cannot form a joint AAW battlespace.

The problem has been known for over a year now. It pretty much popped up after the second Type 124 commissioned. And they're still working on fixing it, with about any attempt short of ripping out the entire system on all three ships. What adds time to is that the three frigates are doing their regular training; the Marine just keeps them "close" and doesn't send them on deployments. By most accounts, the problem "should be solved" next year.

Last week, the Type 124 frigate Hamburg completed the German Operational Sea Training. The GOST is held in a NATO framework at Plymouth under Royal Navy auspices every year. It lasts 6 weeks and effectively trains every part of the ship's crew in full wartime operations; this includes live-fire exercises, firefighting/damage control, and other scenarios, and is finished with the "Weekly War", a full War scenario for a flotilla.

Now, both her sisters, Sachsen and Hessen, completed the same in the years before as flagships of small flotillas. What's different about Hamburg is that she's now actually going to be deployed next year. Not to one of the full deployments (UNIFIL and TF150), but as leader of the EAV - the German training cruise flotilla, which will also include Type 122 frigate Köln and a AOR. In previous times, when a Type 124 lead the EAV, such cruises were short due to above software problems - North Sea, North Atlantic, Mediterranean perhaps.

This time, the three ships will "visit three continents, do live-fire exercises in South Africa, and do joint maneuvers with the South-African and Indian Navies as well as navies of other NATO partners". In short: It'll pretty much revisit SNMG1's cruise around Africa - with a stint across the Indian Ocean as well.

It'll be interesting to see how Hamburg will perform on this cruise. And how much it will be covered publicly. Especially when it enters the TF150 AoR.

Modern Naval Fire Support

TKMS, in its latest release on the F125, has confirmed planned integration of ADLER-II/ASCA into the ship's FCS. A little thing that popped up somewhere in the middle of the text, without much fanfare. And as I understand it, the integration is not just for a proprietary system with an ASCA interface, but full-scale ADLER-II integration.

Now what does that mean? Simple - ASCA is an interface protocol for NATO artillery C2I systems, here in particular the German Army's ADLER-II artillery combat network. ADLER-II provides information distribution, establishment of the battlefield situation, full fire direction and fire control capability for all connected units, and the necessary calculation routines regarding weapon and ammunition selection based on target, weather, geological information and other parameters.

ASCA itself is a joint protocol also allowing the ADLER-II network nodes - and the F125 - to be networked with other Artillery C2I systems, such as the US AFATDS system.
This integration is on some levels similar to the USN Naval Fire Control System (NFCS), although NFCS requires some more complicated local problem resolvement.

This integration will allow a F125 offshore to act within the battlefield network as "just another" artillery gun - available to the artillery network without complication, and capable of providing naval fire support as directed by standard Army forward artillery observers.

What will be interesting is whether they'll integrate the RBS-15 Mk4 missiles into the network as well - it's currently being done for GMLRS missiles on Germany's MARS launchers, so guided systems are definitely not out. Shouldn't be that much trouble, as the Mk4 system is still under early development, and would be a real force multiplier on a tactic-strategic level.

Where are the Corvettes?

The new German K130 "corvette" class (at 1,840 tons, they're light frigates in reality) has received a lot of hype from the German Navy.

However, it seems as though their introduction is turning into a long, drawn-out affair. Originally, it was planned to commission the first two corvettes in 2007, with the other three following in 2008.

To be more exact, F260 Braunschweig was supposed to commission in May 2007, F261 Magdeburg sometime around July. Then May came around, and the Navy pushed commissioning dates back to "Summer 2007" for both ships. Understandable, as Braunschweig did have some problems during her early sea trials - including damaging her screws on a high-speed run.

Then "Summer 2007" rolled around. And where are the corvettes? Well, on trials. Still. They were also not commissioned in Autumn '07. F260 Braunschweig was originally planned for the Northern Coasts 2007 exercise, back in late October (and this was still the plan in September, one of the backposted potential commissioning dates). As she apparently wasn't ready, she was struck from that exercise.

Actually, they're nowhere around their future squadron's homeport, Warnemünde on the Baltic Sea, even - both ships tend to hang around Kiel and in particular Wilhelmshaven lately, the sites of the two Marinearsenal navy yards. Sometimes in other ports for trials, e.g. in Eckernförde (the German submarine force homeport). Occasionally they seem to go to sea for trials, or are used in port shows - but not much else.

There are some rumours that F260 Braunschweig is still supposed to commission this year - though, considering there's only like two weeks left of that year, that's really rather doubtful.

The construction goes on nonetheless. All five corvettes have now been christened and launched, the last one (F264 Ludwigshafen) on September 26th. All corvettes already carry their armament - even Ludwigshafen is being shown with her forward RAM and 76mm displayed proudly.

And even the training of future crews is ongoing. This is done "dry" on a full replica of the stations at the Marinetechnikschule in Stralsund. This has been going on since at least July with two technical crew being trained.

So where's the delay? Some critical failure in building? Engine problems? One can only wonder...

Entering Combat ... though not in the South

Since late October, German forces in Afghanistan have been involved in Operation "Harekate Yolo II", in some cases seeing heavy fighting. This lasted about two weeks, and has only since last week slowly surfaced.

The operation is a joint NATO effort to regain control of the provinces Badghis and Farjab in north-west Afghanistan. Badghis is part of the Italian Regional Command (West) and Farjab lies next to it in the German Regional Command (North) zone.

Over a few previous weeks, Taliban forces had apparently overrun several districts in both provinces, attacking police stations and local security forces, and taking some measure of control in Badghis province in the Italian zone. There, Taliban units also blocked the "Ring Road" which connects all major Afghan cities. Estimates talk about around organized Taliban units numbering around 300 men in the area, with "not only light weapons".

The primary unit in the operation is the 209th Afghan National Army Corps with up to 900 soldiers deployed, along with its embedded Bundeswehr advisors. Germany also supplied recon forces, medical support and logistics units with up to 300 soldiers deployed. Additionally, some 260 Norwegian soldiers were deployed (including the RC(N) QRF from Mazar-e-Sharif), as well as Italian units and other, smaller NATO groups. The German Regional Command under Brigade General Dieter Warnecke, who lead this operation for ISAF, was forward-deployed to Maimaneh in Farjab province, where the Norwegian PRT is located. RC(N) units were not only deployed in Farjab, but, for some time, also out-of-area in Badghis in the Italian zone.

Fighting to regain Badghis province was apparently heavy. For Norway, newspaper Aftenposten cites the Norwegian Commander that last monday's fighting was the heaviest Norwegian units have been involved in since WW2. No NATO casualties in connection with this operation have so far been reported though.

Apparently, several times, air strikes had to be ordered to support ground forces, in one case killing a high Taliban commander according to NATO (and some civilians by unaccounted Afghan sources). These strikes were directed by German or Norwegian advisors accompanying the Afghan forces. In another case, Norwegian Forces had to call in airstrikes as they came under mortar fire from fortified Taliban positions. German Tornado Recce assets were also heavily used in the operation.


After about two weeks, the operation was declared over last week; German and Norwegian units withdrew back from Badghis to Farjab. Badghis was declared in a "state of consolidation", with other NATO troops stabilizing it, and Afghan forces supposed to take back over "in a few weeks".

Taliban troops in the area are of course not beaten yet. Taliban Commander Mansur Dadullah announced a "new front" in the North a week ago, and yesterday in Farjab, Norwegian forces that were involved in the operation suffered one fatality and one injured from a roadside bomb attack.
Pressure on the region has been increasing over the last two months; German troops had already been involved in - less violent - joint operations with ANA units in the eastern part of its zone. The reason for this increase in pressure is a power vacuum created by the local Warlord General Dostum losing influence and money.

Norway is - in light of this and planned future operations - currently increasing its deployment to Afghanistan, with an extra 50 military advisors for the ANA, and a 150-strong combat company with 2-3 helicopters planned for early 2008. These are specifically planned to "increase presence" in RC(N) and will bring the Norwegian deployment to 700 soldiers total. Germany still has a buffer of about 350 soldiers available in its recently extended mandate in addition to the deployed 3,150 soldiers. Defence Minister Jung announced late October that German military advisor numbers to the ANA would be "tripled". The rest of the buffer - about 250 soldiers - will be filled by German troops replacing 240 Danish and Czech troops in the North. A related measure is probably also that six CH-53 - long planned - finally transferred last week from Task Unit Termez/Uzbekistan to Task Unit Mazar-e-Sharif.

The recent fighting - also in the South and East - is some of the last major operations on both sides before the Afghan Winter will grind everything to a halt later this month. It'll be interesting to see what will happen in spring.

A reiteration of "Basis See"

As it's popped up around a couple forums, a reiteration of the concept.

The concept intends not to build a taskforce around a single base unit, but to assemble a taskforce in which every ship provides specific capabilities.

Within the stabilization forces (as these are the more interesting ones for "Basis See"):

• Type 125 FFG: C3, MIO base, Land Attack, ASuW, Escort, transport/ASW/SAR (2 helos)
  
• Type 143A FAC: ASuW, Escort, Patrol (Link 11/Palis CMS)
• Type 212A SSK: Patrol/Surveillance, ASW, ASuW, SOF
  
• Type 332 MCMV: Minehunting (Penguin B3 UUV)
• Type 333 MCMV: Minehunting (Seefuchs I UUV), Patrol (Link 11/Palis CMS)
• Type 352 MCMV: Minesweeping (Seehund USV), Patrol (Link 11/Palis CMS)
• Type 404 AGS: supply, limited C3, maintenance
  
• Type 702 AOR: supply, limited C3, medical, transport (78 TEU), evacuation (450 PX), transport/ASW/SAR (2 helos)
• P-3C MPA: Patrol/Surveillance, ASuW, ASW
  

In the up-downward 3-tier system, the Intervention Forces lend downward support for AAW and ASW in particular, the Support Forces lend upward support with towing, supply, transport etc.

Within "Basis See", units out of the above are attached as needed.

The F125 in particular is not intended as a "mothership" of any sorts, nor is it intended to optionally have the capabilities that other units within the "Basis See" provide. The A702 EGVs have far more of such a "multi-role base" role.